



**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY**

**SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF LEAP  
IMPLEMENTATION, EMERGING TRENDS AND  
CHALLENGES FOR WILDLIFE CRIME IN THE SADC  
REGION**



**November 2021**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	3
1 INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 Purpose of this document	5
1.2 Background	5
1.3 Key concepts to take forward	6
2 OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORKS FOR COMBATING WILDLIFE CRIME IN THE SADC REGION	7
2.1 Regional protocols and strategies applicable to combatting wildlife crime in the SADC region	7
2.2 Overview of legislative changes in the region during the previous LEAP period	16
3 REVIEW OF CURRENT SADC LEAP IMPLEMENTATION BY OBJECTIVE	21
3.1 Enhancement of legislation on wildlife and law enforcement	22
3.1.1 Enhancement of legislation and judicial processes	22
3.1.2 Minimization of wildlife crime and illegal trade	24
3.2 Integration of people and nature	25
3.3 Sustainable trade and use of natural resources	27
3.4 Improvement and strengthening of field operations	27
3.5 Other general feedback received on SADC LEAP implementation	28
4 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT WILDLIFE CRIME TRENDS IN THE SADC REGION	28
4.1 Current status of wildlife crime in the region	28
4.1.1 Rhino poaching and rhino horn trafficking	29
4.1.2 Elephant poaching and elephant ivory trafficking	31
4.1.3 Poaching of large carnivores and trafficking of their body-parts	34
4.1.4 Pangolin scale trafficking and the live pangolin market	35
4.1.5 Abalone poaching and trafficking	36
4.1.6 Timber trafficking	37
4.2 An analysis of emerging trends and threats	38
4.2.1 Potential substitution species	39
4.2.2 Emerging species: legal and illegal	40
4.2.3 Human wildlife conflict, retaliatory killings and related concerns	41
4.2.4 Marine species in demand in Southeast and East Asia	41
4.2.5 Confluence of markets, sources and routes	42
4.2.6 Pet trade	43
4.2.7 Bushmeat	43
4.2.8 Corruption as a facilitator for wildlife crime	44
4.2.9 Convergence IWT and other illicit flows	44
4.2.10 Other issues of concern.	45
5 KEY LESSONS FROM THIS SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS	45
APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED	49
APPENDIX 2: PEOPLE CONSULTED	56
A2.1 Member State workshop attendees (2-3 June 2021)	56
A2.2 Individual interviews conducted (January – November 2021)	57


A2.3 SADC Regional Technical Validation Meeting (25-26 October 2021)	59
A2.4 Other relevant meetings / workshops attended	60
A2.4.1 USAID VukaNow SPARCC-7: Implementation of SADC LEAP Strategy: Lessons, Models and the Way Forward (March 2021)	60
A2.4.2 Sub-regional platform for CWC (March 2021)	62
A2.4.3 USAID VukaNow SPARCC-9 & 10: Effective Partnerships and KPI's for CWC impact (June 2021)	63
A2.5 Engagement summary	64

## Acronyms

ANAC	National Administration for Conservation Areas (Mozambique)
BRTF	Blue Rhino Task Force (Namibia)
CAR	Central African Republic
CBNRM	Community-based natural resources management
CITES	Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CWC	Combating wildlife crime
DEFF	Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (South Africa)
DNPW	Department of National Parks and Wildlife (Malawi and Zambia)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DWNP	Department of Wildlife and National Parks (Botswana)
EIA	Environmental Investigations Agency
ETIS	Elephant Trade Information System
FCS	Focused Conservation
FLoD	First Line of Defence
FZS	Frankfurt Zoological Society
GI-TOC	Global Initiative for Transnational Organised Crime
GIZ	German Agency for International Development
GLTFCA	Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Agency
ICP	International Cooperating Partner
IFAW	International Fund for Animal Welfare
IIU	Intelligence and investigations unit
INBAC	National Institute for Biodiversity and Conservation Areas (Angola)
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US Dept of State)
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWT	Illegal wildlife trade
KAZA	Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area
KPI	Key performance indicator
LATF	Lusaka Agreement Task Force
LEAP	Law Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Strategy
LRT	Lowveld Rhino Trust
LWT	Lilongwe Wildlife Trust
MAZALA	Malawi-Zambia Transfrontier Conservation Area
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEDD	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Madagascar)

MIKE	Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Tanzania)
MS	Member State(s) of SADC
MTEC	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture (Lesotho)
Nampol	The Namibian Police Force
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NCP	Niassa Carnivore Project
NTC	National Trust Commission (eSwatini)
PA	Protected Area
PPF	Peace Parks Foundation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-TWIX	SADC Trade in Wildlife Information eXchange
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TCM	Traditional Chinese Medicine
TFCA	Trans-frontier Conservation Area
THF	Tikki Hywood Foundation
UfW	United for Wildlife
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US-DEA	United States Drugs Enforcement Administration
USFWS	United States Fish and Wildlife Service
WCP	Wildlife Crime Prevention
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WCU	Wildlife crime unit
WD	Wildlife Division (of the MNRT, Tanzania)
WJC	Wildlife Justice Commission
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZPWMA	Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority

This document was developed by Conservation Synergies. Lead author Alastair Nelson with support from Nicola Okes, George Wambura, Chizamsoka Manda, Adam Armstrong, and Rob Craig. [alastair@conservationsynergies.com](mailto:alastair@conservationsynergies.com)



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose of this document

This document reviews progress and challenges for the implementation of the existing Law Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Strategy (LEAP) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It also summarises and analyses emerging wildlife crime trends and challenges faced by the region in combatting wildlife crime.

This document has been developed using information gathered from document reviews (see Appendix 1), three workshops held with SADC Member States (MS) under this contract, individual interviews conducted with relevant Member State officials, civil society and technical experts, and information gathered from other recent workshops and meetings that are of specific relevance to this review. The key workshops, meetings and interviews, and a list of all of the individuals consulted or involved in each, are listed in Appendix 2. In total 141 individuals were consulted, 57 of whom work for SADC Member States – representing 15 of the 16 SADC Member States. These are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

## 1.2 Background

The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) has developed into a diverse and lucrative form of transnational organized crime, placing serious pressure on fauna and flora worldwide. Wildlife crime is currently considered the fourth most lucrative type of organized crime globally and 2014 estimates of the annual value of IWT were in the range of \$7-\$23 billion (van Uhm, 2016; Nellemann et al. 2016; UNODC, 2020). However, it is increasingly being recognised that the real costs of the illegal trade in fish, forestry products and wildlife must consider economic losses from ecosystem services, and recent global estimates of this value are at USD 1 trillion or more (World Bank, 2019). The hidden costs of these illicit trades not only include the costs of lost ecosystem services (such as carbon storage and water filtration for example) but also include the loss of potential revenue from the sustainable use of natural resources, as well as depriving local communities that rely on these resources for their livelihoods (World Bank, 2019). As a region of high biodiversity and substantial wildlife populations, the SADC region has become a major source for many wildlife products in demand. Thus, SADC Member States are at the forefront of global efforts to tackle wildlife crime and protect vulnerable human populations. And as such, wildlife crime is one of the most expensive security challenges facing Southern Africa (McLellan et al., 2014).

The current trend in wildlife crime in the SADC region as well as globally, is that of increasingly sophisticated criminal networks, using increasingly sophisticated methods to source and transport a diversity of products across multiple borders to reach destination markets. As the illicit trade in wildlife evolves to counter continuous strategic and tactical developments in law enforcement and anti-poaching, criminal networks have developed complex financial mechanisms to fund their activities and evade detection. Networks are opportunistic and flexible and are thus able to both adapt to changes in market demands and capitalize on opportunities to diversify products in trade. There is evidence of convergence of wildlife trafficking with other illicit markets – both network convergence (i.e., where organised criminal networks trade in multiple products, including wildlife products) and facilitator / hub convergence (i.e., where wildlife products rely on the same facilitators to move through the same transport hubs as other illicit products). High value wildlife products have in many ways just become another valuable commodity that organised crime networks acquire and traffic from source site to destination market. As such, once wildlife products are being

trafficked, they take on the characteristics of most other illicit flows and we should view them through that lens and work to include them more centrally in global efforts to tackle transnational organised crime. Thus, strategically it is worth dividing wildlife crime into two specific stages – (1) the poaching of the animal or product, and (2) the trafficking of the extracted product to market.

Corruption plays a central role in wildlife crime – particularly wildlife trafficking. In general, corruption supports the existence of organized crime, because corrupt public officials protect organized criminal groups from law enforcement and disruption, and also facilitate the movement of illicit goods across borders (UNODC, 2021). Organised crime corrupts officials, and corruption then creates an enabling environment for organised crime – resulting in a feedback loop that weakens governance and rule of law, thus undermining both sustainable development for local people, and environmental security. Corruption can also enable wildlife poaching, especially in instances with high value wildlife products that are hard to access, where it makes sense for poaching groups to invest in corrupting officials to facilitate access.

### **1.3 Key concepts to take forward**

Our conceptual understanding of wildlife crime has evolved over the last five to eight years. Similarly, we have learned both lessons from our works to combat wildlife crime. This impacts the strategies and tactics we should consider adopting going forward. Key concepts to keep in mind when reading this document include:

- Poaching of an animal or illegal extraction of an environmental product is the first step in the value chain of wildlife crime. This is the action where conservation law enforcement has typically functioned in the past. This is normally where there is the closest linkage to local communities.
- Wildlife trafficking is both conceptually and functionally different to wildlife poaching and much more akin to other forms of illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime.
- Corruption is central to wildlife crime – it is fundamental to wildlife trafficking, less vital for poaching, but can still play a critical role, especially for high value wildlife products that are difficult to access.
- We need to adopt different strategies and tactics depending on the type of wildlife product being illegally harvested, where on the wildlife crime value chain we are intervening, and the extent of the engagement of organised criminal actors.
- Given the central role corruption plays in wildlife crime we also need to consider the resilience to corruption of key institutions on the wildlife crime value chain, as well as the resilience to corruption of officials working on the ground for key organisations. This requires us to proactively focus on governance and management of key organisations and processes.

The next section provides an overview of the legal and policy framework and context for tackling wildlife crime in the SADC region. Section 3 reviews the progress and challenges for implementing the current SADC-LEAP strategy. Section 4 summarises and analyses emerging wildlife crime trends and challenges faced by the region in combatting wildlife crime. Finally, key lessons and thoughts from this situational analysis are presented in section 5.

## **2 Overview of the frameworks for combating wildlife crime in the SADC region**

### ***2.1 Regional protocols and strategies applicable to combatting wildlife crime in the SADC region***

Several strategies and protocols within the SADC region have been developed to specifically mandate collaboration between Member States over the protection, sustainable use and/or conservation of shared resources, and thus include combatting wildlife crime. The Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement provides the impetus for the development of the SADC LEAP, and is supported by protocols, investment and development plans relating to forestry, biodiversity, tourism, agriculture, and transfrontier conservation areas. The LEAP is also explicitly linked to broader regional and international plans and goals, including the African Union, NEPAD and the global Sustainable Development Goals. Some of the relevant and important protocols, plans and strategies are summarised and described in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary descriptions of the current regional protocols and strategies applicable to CWC in the SADC region (policies described in the previous SADC LEAP strategy (2015-2021) are provided as direct excerpts – noted with an asterisk\*)

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
SADC Declaration and Treaty (1992, consolidated amended 2015)	*The Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) recognizes the dependence of SADC communities on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. It identifies food security, sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment as some of the key objectives of SADC in sustaining its development process. It emphasizes that the exploitation and utilisation of natural resources requires good management and conservation to ensure that development does not reduce or impair the diversity and richness of the region’s natural resources base and the environment. The Treaty therefore recognizes wildlife as a key natural resource and a major component of the environment, which should be managed for the benefit of SADC communities."	The LEAP is the mechanism to protect wildlife, which is recognised in this protocol as a key natural resource and a major component of the environment, which should be contributing to the sustainable development of SADC communities.
Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (1999)	<p>This Protocol, signed by the 14 members in 1999, applies to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife (excluding forestry and fishery resources) and provides the impetus of the SADC Law Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Strategy (SADC LEAP). The primary objective of the Protocol is to establish common approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources and to assist with the effective enforcement of laws governing those resources within the region. Each State Party commits to ensuring that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the wildlife resources of other states or in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.</p> <p>The institutional mechanisms to implement the Protocol are outlined in Article 5; the Wildlife Sector Coordinating Committee and the Technical Committee are the two key bodies with the former acting as the Secretariat responsible for implementing the</p>	The LEAP strategy is the mechanism to implement this Protocol, it specifically addresses the following objectives from this Protocol: 1) facilitate the harmonisation of the legal instruments governing wildlife use and conservation; 2) promote the enforcement of wildlife laws within, between and among States Parties; 3) facilitate the exchange of information concerning wildlife management, utilisation and the enforcement of wildlife laws; 4) assist in the building of national and regional capacity for wildlife management, conservation and enforcement of wildlife laws; 5) promote the conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas; and 6) facilitate community-based natural resources management practices for management of wildlife resources.



Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>Protocol at the regional level. The Technical Committee consists of the Directors of the various national wildlife agencies who, in terms of the Protocol, are required to meet annually "... to co-ordinate development of policy guidelines for common regional approaches to the conservation and sustainable use of wildlife resources." These committees report back to the Committee of Ministers which is responsible for adopting regional wildlife policies and development strategies and taking into consideration and approving any recommendations to amend or adopt policies and strategies."</p>	
<p>Protocol on Forestry (2002)</p>	<p>*"The SADC Protocol on Forestry provides the over-arching policy framework for forestry collaboration amongst Member States. In the context of wildlife, the Protocol lays out several guiding principles on the protection, management, and utilisation of all types of forests and trees which in turn benefits wildlife conservation. Legal harvest and trade in forest products serve to alleviate poverty and generate economic opportunities, a key component of community conservation. This further supports the achievement of effective environmental protection, safeguarding the interests of both present and future generations."</p>	<p>The LEAP provides the mechanism to implement the parts of this Protocol that relate to wildlife, including forests. The Protocol 'lays out guiding principles on the protection, management, and utilisation of all types of forests and trees which in turn benefits wildlife conservation'.</p>
<p>The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)</p>	<p>*The ultimate objective of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP, launched in March 2004) is to deepen the integration agenda of SADC with a view to accelerating poverty eradication and the attainment of other economic and non-economic development goals. Furthermore, it embraces the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). At the SADC Council of Ministers meeting in Mauritius in 2004, it was recommended that the SADC and NEPAD Secretariats should work closely with the latter providing a pivotal role of translating NEPAD objectives into practical implementable programmes, projects, and activities at</p>	<p>The LEAP is the mechanism to protect wildlife, which is a key natural resource contributing to the economic development of the region through provision of livelihoods and ensuring food availability.</p>

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>the sub-regional level. Similarly, the conservation, management and use of natural resources are listed in the RISDP as a major component to Ensure Food Availability. In addition, SADC wildlife provides a significant number of products, mostly in the form of bushmeat, to many people in the region.</p> <p>The RISDP was updated for the period 2020–2030, which seeks to help realise the SADC’s Vision 2050, which envisages “a peaceful, inclusive, competitive, middle- to high-income industrialised region, where all citizens enjoy sustainable economic well-being, justice, and freedom”</p>	
SADC Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP) – 2016	<p>The SADC Regional Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP, 2017-2022), developed in 2015 as an investment plan to operationalise the SADC Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP). The RAP was prepared in 2013, with the goal of contributing towards the attainment of the SADC Common Agenda which promotes sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development. 'This project forms part of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) identified under the SADC region envelope in line with the 11th EDF 2014 - 2020 Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. The overall objective of this action is to accelerate progress towards implementation of SADC regional integration.'<sup>[1]</sup>. The RAP recognises illegal logging and illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing as key challenges affecting the region and note that 'promoting responsible and sustainable use of the living aquatic resources and aquatic ecosystems has been formalised as a priority objective of SADC under the Protocol on Fisheries (2001) [and the SADC Protocol on Forestry, 2002]. The RAP includes the policy statement: "SADC shall stimulate and support Member States’ efforts to improve production, processing, trade,</p>	The LEAP is a mechanism which can support the RAIP in its aim of ‘promoting collaborative actions at the regional level and complementing national actions that stimulate competitive production and trade of agriculture-based products whilst ensuring the sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment’.

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>conservation and sustainable management of forest and fisheries resources". 'The RAIP will contribute to regional integration, a priority for African countries to accelerate agricultural development, increase regional trade and facilitate the movement of services, finances and people across borders. The RAIP prioritizes areas for investments and builds on the principle of subsidiarity between national and regional levels. It outlines five priority investment programmes on agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness; access to markets and trade of agriculture products; investments in and access to finance for agriculture; social and economic vulnerability reduction; and food and nutrition security in the region.'<sup>[1]</sup></p>	
<p>SADC TFCA Programme (2011)</p>	<p>The SADC TFCA Programme was developed and adopted by SADC Member States in 2011 with the mission to: "develop SADC into a functional and integrated network of transfrontier conservation areas where shared natural resources are sustainably co-managed and conserved to foster socioeconomic development, and regional integration for the benefit of people living within and around TFCAs, the SADC region, and the world". The SADC TFCAs Programme has seven key components with specific objectives, activities and outputs carried out at the regional, sub-regional and national levels, namely: policy harmonisation and advocacy; sustainable financing; capacity building; data and knowledge management; local livelihoods; climate change vulnerability; and TFCAs as marketable tourism products.</p> <p>The programme calls for the commitment of the Member States to establish TFCAs and implement activities on the ground by budgeting for this programme at national level, while lobbying for additional financial and technical support from International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) and the private sector. It is related to</p>	<p>The LEAP supports collaboration and cooperation between individual member states when they share a TFCA in order to collaboratively address wildlife crime in each TFCA. It provides a common framework and strategic approach for member states to tackle wildlife crime with these TFCAs.</p>

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>and complemented by a number of protocols and strategies that 'provide an enabling environment for the establishment and development of TFCAs in the SADC region'. These include the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (1999), the SADC Protocol on Forestry (2002), the SADC Protocol on Shared Water Courses (2002) and the SADC Regional Biodiversity Strategy (2006).<sup>1</sup></p> <p>Based on the SADC TFCA Programme, a network of TFCA practitioners was established under the auspices of SADC in September 2013 with the purpose of overcoming "TFCA challenges through shared learning, knowledge management and collaboration"[2]. One mechanism to do this has been the launch of an interactive intranet to enable SADC TFCA practitioners to share information, experiences, and knowledge. The TFCA Network members support the development of regional guidelines and strategies, including the SADC LEAP.</p>	
SADC Regional Biodiversity Strategy (2008)	<p>The purpose of the Regional Biodiversity Strategy is to provide a framework for regional cooperation on biodiversity issues that transcend national boundaries and to stimulate the combined and synergistic efforts by SADC Member States and their communities in biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use. It contributes to the achievement of SADC's goals of social and economic development and poverty eradication as embedded in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP); the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Environmental Action Plan; and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The strategy has three main strategic areas for priority: 1) to enhance the region's economic and business base; 2) to ensure those economic opportunities emerging from "biotrade" do not lead to unsustainable practices; and 3) to develop and implement</p>	<p>The LEAP provides a strategic framework and approach for Member States to address two strategic priority areas from this strategy: 1) to address wildlife crimes associated with unsustainable use related to biotrade; and 2) to protect key resources which may contribute to enhancing the region's economic base.</p>

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>biodiversity awareness and capacity building. The Regional Biodiversity Strategy is built around values of biodiversity and constraints to biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use in the region. These were formulated from country level constraints articulated in national planning frameworks such as NBSAPs.</p>	
<p>SADC Regional Tourism Programme (2020 – 2030)</p>	<p>The SADC Tourism Programme aims to guide and coordinate the development of a sustainable tourism industry in the region and assist in removing barriers to tourism development and growth. The Tourism Programme will be implemented with knowledge of global tourism programmes including the United Nations World Tourism Organisation’s (UNWTO) Agenda for Africa, African Union’s Agenda 2063, East African Community’s (EAC) tourism programmes and Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa’s (COMESA) tourism initiatives. The Programme will be implemented within the policy and planning guidelines provided by the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (2015-2020), the original SADC Protocol on the Development of Tourism (1998) and the subsequently amended SADC Protocol on the Development of Tourism (2009). The Vision of the Programme for 2030 is that growth in cross-border, multi-destination travel in SADC will exceed average global tourism growth levels. The Mission is to advocate, facilitate, and effectively coordinate tourism policies, programmes, and practices in the region in collaboration with Member States. Three principles underpin SADC’s Tourism Programme namely a) advancing sustainable tourism development and promoting economic</p>	<p>The LEAP is a key mechanism to protect the wildlife resource base (both terrestrial and marine) which underpins a large part of the tourism product which many SADC member states benefit from.</p>

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	<p>inclusion and transformation; b) maximising partnerships and c) following a whole-of-government approach.</p> <p>The Programme states that given SADC Tourism Coordinating Unit's (TCU's) limited resources and the fact that tourism is a highly integrated sector, SADC TCU will, depending on the issues at stake, take a three-tiered approach in advancing the SADC Tourism Programme namely to a) advocate, b) facilitate and c) coordinate and monitor implementation.</p>	
<p>African Union "African common strategy on combatting illegal exploitation and illegal trade in wild fauna and flora in Africa (2016-25)</p>	<p>The AU Strategic framework for the African Strategy, 2016 - 2015 (declared in 2015) arose from a decision regarding the illicit trade in African wild fauna and flora in 2014. The decision called for the collaborative development of an African Strategy on Combatting Illegal Exploitation and Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora with the vision of 'an Africa free from illegal exploitation and illegal trade in wild fauna and flora by 2063'. Importantly, the strategy aims to guide a common, coordinated response by countries in Africa to combat the illegal trade, ensuring that Africa's priorities are considered.</p> <p>The strategy recognises that illegal trade is not only a conservation issue, but it also undermines security and sustainable development. It builds on international commitments and declarations related to the challenges posed by IWT, and supports actions taken by African governments to implement obligations under related agreements, for example CITES, the Lusaka and Maputo international agreements and the African Elephant Action Plan. "The Strategy promotes a strong national, regional and</p>	<p>The LEAP is SADC's mechanism contributing towards the implementation of this strategy within the SADC region. The AU strategy allows for SADC Member States to collaborate beyond their SADC partners with AU Member States. It aims at 'providing an agreed Africa-wide framework for operationalizing decisions reached at various international fora and mobilization of resources to support and ensure its implementation.'</p> <p>The strategic objectives significant to SADC LEAP initiatives include improving governance, integrity and enhancing regional, inter-regional cooperation; with specific components and actions stated as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enhance cooperation amongst source, transit, and destination countries.</li> <li>- Promote collective engagement by the region with the transit and demand/consumer states;</li> <li>- Facilitate and support the establishment of a regional network to a) enhance cross border and regional cooperation and b) exchange and share information and intelligence between enforcement agencies and the implied judicial sector.</li> </ul>

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	international response towards safeguarding all wild fauna and flora in Africa and complements all other ongoing programmes, initiatives and activities. The strategy addresses issues relating to source, transit, and destination countries of illegally traded wild fauna and flora and their products (through 2016- 2025).	
NEPAD Environment Action Plan (2003)	The NEPAD Action Plan of the Environment Initiative was adopted for the prioritisation of the root causes of environmental degradation and the identification of the most effective projects from an environmental, institutional, and financial perspective. A coherent, strategic, and long-term programme of action was prepared to promote Africa’s sustainable development; consistent with NEPAD’s emphasis on measures that will ensure that the continent is able to confront its short-term economic growth challenges without losing sight of the long-term environmental, poverty eradication and social development imperatives. A review of the Action Plan was conducted in 2012 and listed within its review of progress on the conservation and management of natural resources, the development of several TBNRM initiatives and related TFCAs.	The LEAP assists the SADC Members States in contributing to proposed actions under this NEPAD Action Plan. Specific NEPAD Actions that are relevant to the SADC LEAP include: encouraging information sharing; to strengthen activities in transboundary investigation of poaching and illegal trade undertaken by criminal syndicates; to develop joint activities to reduce illegal wildlife trade; and to encourage African Governments to take measures to implement their obligations under international agreements aimed at combating bribery and corruption in international business transactions as they pertain to trade in timber and wildlife.
Millennium Development Goals (2000 – 2015)	The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were a set of 8 goals adopted globally to combat poverty and improve the lives of the world’s poorest people. The MDG’s have now been superseded by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs, also known as the Global Goals): 17 goals with 169 targets that all UN Member States have agreed to work towards achieving by the year 2030. They set out a vision for a world free from poverty, hunger, and disease. The critical role of nature and the need for sustainable use of natural resources is evident throughout the goals. Three of the 17 goals are related directly to wildlife trade and consumption, namely life on land, life below water, and	The LEAP is a mechanism for SADC to prioritize some of the global goals. Specifically, in a report of the progress towards these goals (MDG, 2015), the authors noted that significantly: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Overexploitation of marine fisheries is rising, threatening ecosystems and livelihoods.</li> <li>- Biodiversity is in decline, with some of the world’s oldest species (e.g., cycads) threatened with extinction; and</li> <li>- Environmental sustainability is a core pillar of the post-2015 development agenda.</li> </ul> The SADC LEAP helps Member States to address these challenges.

Name of protocol	Summary description	How the LEAP relates to each Protocol
	responsible consumption and production.	

<sup>[1]</sup> <http://www.fao.org/support-to-investment/news/detail/en/c/434424/>

<sup>[2]</sup> [Table 2](https://www.sadc.int/themes/natural-resources/transfrontier-conservation-areas/): Relevant or significant changes in legislation per SADC Member State in the last five years.

## 2.2 Overview of legislative changes in the region during the previous LEAP period

Table 2: Relevant or significant changes in legislation per SADC Member State in the last 5 years.

Member State	Wildlife crime challenges (recent & emerging)	Other transboundary initiatives involved in	Known legislative changes since 2016-2021
Angola	African grey parrot, white-bellied pangolin, gorilla, elephant	Mayombe Forest TFCA (Angola, Gabon, Gabon, DRC) Mayombe Transboundary Initiative (Angola, Congo and Gabon) Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA Benguela Current Commission (Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME)) Iona-Skeleton Coast TFCA	Progress towards the National Ivory Action Plan as updated in 2018 included: - The adoption of Wildlife and Forest Act by the National Assembly - Exchanges of experience within SADF in the implementation of laws covering crimes against the environment Pending and partial progress in 2018 were stated as: - Preparation on a joint decree on import and export duties covering animals and plants - Harmonisation of the environment related legal qualifications with the new criminal code. - Publication of the new Criminal Code applying penalties for wildlife crimes - Adoption of the Act on Careers and Remuneration of Forest Rangers and Eco-guards - Development of The National Legislation on CITES Implementation - Adoption by the National Assembly of the Wildlife and Conservation Areas Act.
Botswana	Elephant, rhino	Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA Kgalagadi TFCA	Lifted ban on elephant hunting - 2019.



Member State	Wildlife crime challenges (recent & emerging)	Other transboundary initiatives involved in	Known legislative changes since 2016-2021
		Greater Mapungubwe TFCA	
Comoros		Nairobi Convention	In 2020 the State reviewed the Penal Code to “continue to build on their successes in terms of maritime trade and industry by strengthening its primary legal framework. To incorporate the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) into its new national legislation, Comoros sought out the assistance of the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP). By February 2021, with UNODC’s legal and technical support, the country promulgated the new Penal Code, amending specific provisions on maritime crimes, in a bid to align these with international law.” (UNODC, 2021).
Democratic Republic of Congo	Elephant, bushmeat Known transit route for pangolin trafficking	COMIFAC Regional Action Plan for Strengthening National Wildlife Law Implementation, 2012 – 2017.  Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC).  Mayombe Forest TFCA Mayombe Forest TFCA (Angola, Gabon, DRC)	The NIAP states that the legislation changes in the DRC include a decree (n°021/CAB/MIN/EDD/AAN/WF/05/2017 of 31 August 2017) transferring the CITES Management Authority to the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN). Article 79 of this new law mandates prison terms of 5-10 years and fines of 20 – 100 million Congolese Francs as penalties.
eSwatini		Lusaka Agreement	
Lesotho		Lusaka Agreement Maloti-Drakensberg TFCDA	
Madagascar	Reptiles, rosewood timber	Nairobi Convention	

Member State	Wildlife crime challenges (recent & emerging)	Other transboundary initiatives involved in	Known legislative changes since 2016-2021
	Emerging trade in marine species		
Malawi	Elephant, pangolin	Malawi-Zambia TFCA  Signed SOPs for the 4-country sub-regional platform for CWC – Malawi-Mozambique-Tanzania-Zambia	Amendment to the National Parks and Wildlife Act (NPWA, 2017) strengthened wildlife crime penalty provisions, ensuring wildlife offenses treated seriously.
Mauritius		Nairobi Convention	Native Terrestrial Biodiversity and National Parks Act of 2015 re-enforced protection of terrestrial native biodiversity including combatting IWT  National Parks and CITES (Prescribed Species) Regulations have been drafted (2021) and are with the Parent Ministry.
Mozambique	Rhino, elephant. Emerging threats relating to lions, as well as marine species. Known hub for organised ivory trafficking networks	Transboundary Cooperation Agreement with Tanzania in development.  A mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) was signed between Mozambique and Vietnam in 2018 to strengthen bilateral cooperation to combat transnational crimes, including wildlife crime	Amendments to the Conservation Law (no. 16 of 2014) entered into force in 2017, have resulted in the strengthening of Mozambique’s wildlife trade penalties. Previous ambiguities have been removed, and penalties have been increased (e.g. African elephants are fully protected and maximum prison terms for wildlife offences have been increased to 16 years).

Member State	Wildlife crime challenges (recent & emerging)	Other transboundary initiatives involved in	Known legislative changes since 2016-2021
		<p>Signed SOPs for the 4-country sub-regional platform for CWC – Malawi-Mozambique-Tanzania-Zambia</p> <p>Greater Limpopo TFCA Chimanimani TFCA Nairobi Convention</p>	
Namibia	Rhino, elephant	<p>Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA Benguela Current Commission (Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME) Ai Ais - Richtersveld TFCA Iona-Skeleton Coast TFCA</p>	
Seychelles	Emerging trade in marine species	Nairobi Convention	<p>Trade of Wild Fauna and Flora Bill 2021 was approved in July 2021, this gives better protection and curbs illegal trade activities in endemic animal and plant species</p> <p>New regulations under the Wild Animals and Birds Protection Act to protect two species currently involved in IWT were approved in January 2021.</p>
South Africa	Rhino, elephant, pangolin, abalone, large cat species, cycads.	<p>Greater Limpopo TFCA Lusaka Agreement Kgalagadi TFCA Greater Mapungubwe TFCA GLTFCA Nairobi Convention</p>	National Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking (NISCWT) developed by the government in 2017.

Member State	Wildlife crime challenges (recent & emerging)	Other transboundary initiatives involved in	Known legislative changes since 2016-2021
Tanzania	Emerging trade in marine species	Lusaka Agreement Nairobi Convention  Signed SOPs for the 4-country sub-regional platform for CWC – Malawi-Mozambique-Tanzania-Zambia	Although currently not participating in the NIAP process, have in the past stated progress towards NIAP goals regarding legislation as achieved (NIAP Progress Report (SC70 Doc. 27.4), 2018): - Amendment of the Wildlife Conservation Act. No. 5 of 2009 - Operationalization of the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA) - Review of the Wildlife Conservation (CITES Implementation) Regulations, 2005 - Improvement of prosecutions of wildlife related cases - Preparation of CITES Implementation Regulations for Zanzibar
Zambia	Elephant, bushmeat, timber	Lusaka Agreement Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA Malawi-Zambia TFCA  Signed SOPs for the 4-country sub-regional platform for CWC – Malawi-Mozambique-Tanzania-Zambia	
Zimbabwe	Rhino, elephant, pangolin	Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA Greater Mapungubwe TFCA Greater Limpopo TFCA Chimanimani TFCA	

### 3 Review of current SADC LEAP implementation by objective

For this part of the situational analysis information was collected from Member States in three ways:

1. All Members States were contacted on multiple occasions and offered individual interviews. Twelve of the sixteen Member States responded and officials working in a technical capacity to combat wildlife crime in these Member States were interviewed individually.
2. An online questionnaire survey was sent to all 16 Member States.
3. Virtual workshops were conducted to glean input into this revised strategy from Member States, and all sixteen Member States were invited. Whilst these workshops were facilitated in English, and translation into French and Portuguese was made available (See Appendix 2 A2.1).

The targeted interviews included a combination of fourteen questions aimed at understanding the development and implementation of strategies to combat wildlife crime (with details on interagency task forces, intelligence units and coordination of CWC activities), engagement with prosecutors and the judiciary (including court monitoring, forensic capacity and effective prosecutions), regional collaboration to tackle transnational organised crime, community engagement strategies and outcomes, and mechanisms to fund counter wildlife crime activities.

The fundamental question of whether the SADC LEAP Strategy contributed to improving a Member States' wildlife crime situation was met with mixed responses. There were two extremes: one Member State described the LEAP strategy as instrumental in guiding their national strategy which underpinned their achievements, whilst another stated clearly that the existing LEAP strategy had not contributed to improving their wildlife crime situation and criticised coordination for effective alignment to aid implementation of the strategy. The remaining responses were neutral and non-committal regarding the role the LEAP strategy played in helping them to tackle wildlife crime.

Table 3: Summary of status of national CWC strategy for Member States interviewed.

Member State	CWC strategy	Aligned with SADC LEAP
Angola	In draft	Aligned
Botswana	Being drafted	Generally following LEAP structure – awaiting feedback on revised structure.
DRC	There is a National Anti-Poaching and Law Enforcement framework (2016) that focuses on the Protected Areas.	Not aligned with the previous LEAP.
Malawi	No national CWC strategy, but other mechanisms in place to tackle wildlife crime, e.g., National Elephant Action Plan and National Ivory Action Plan.	Don't directly use LEAP framework but it has been heavily consulted.
Mauritius	No national CWC strategy. However, CWC engagement included in 2015 Act and cases dealt with on an ad hoc basis.	Previous LEAP did not directly align with, or address IWT challenges Mauritius faces. No focal point assigned. This has been addressed.
Mozambique	Internal ANAC CWC strategy used to work strategically with other national agencies to address wildlife crime. LEAP strategy being developed by a consultant.	Take the SADC LEAP into account when planning CWC work.

Namibia	Recent revised strategy	Aligned, followed own structure
Seychelles	No national CWC strategy yet, but plans afoot to develop policy, strategy and improve internal coordination.	Previous LEAP did not directly align with, or address IWT challenges Seychelles faces. No focal point assigned. This has been addressed.
South Africa	New strategy recently approved	Aligned, followed own structure
Tanzania	Being revised, in draft	Aligned, followed own structure
Zambia	No National CWC Strategy. Still in the process of setting up – stalled by funding issues.	Will align a CWC strategy with the LEAP strategy. CWC activities are not well coordinated.
Zimbabwe	Final draft awaiting ratification	Aligned, followed own structure

Most Member States reported that they referred to the existing LEAP strategy for input on addressing key wildlife crime issues – be that as they tackled wildlife crime issues based on other plans and frameworks that they were using (for Member States without a national CWC strategy), or within their national CWC strategy (for Member States with a national CWC strategy). Member States generally treated the existing LEAP strategy as a guide to think about what was needed in their context for their national CWC strategic responses and cherry-picked what was relevant.

Some Member States mentioned that the previous LEAP strategy did not align with, nor address the IWT challenges that they faced – particularly for island states. These Member States have been slower in developing a national CWC strategy, possibly because IWT has not been a major challenge to them, and they did not typically appoint a LEAP focal point. These Member States made suggestions for how to make the revised LEAP strategy more applicable to their situation and contexts.

In some instances, Member States specifically spoke about wanting the revised LEAP strategy to be more of a strategic framework that provided an overview and guidance and acted as a mechanism for coordination, and then each Member State could draw from it to develop their own CWC strategies. This would require the SADC Secretariat to play an active role in ensuring alignment with the LEAP strategy during planning, as well as regular coordination and regular feedback on what Member States are achieving or struggling with. This would include regular consolidated reporting.

A brief analysis of the implementation of each specific objective of the previous LEAP strategy follows.

### **3.1 Enhancement of legislation on wildlife and law enforcement**

This specific objective will be reviewed in its two component pieces, which will help with analysis.

#### **3.1.1 Enhancement of legislation and judicial processes**

All Member States engaged reported positive outcomes in terms of improved legislation that: i) criminalised wildlife crime, ii) drew a distinction between poaching and trafficking (i.e., killing the animal vs possessing or trading in the wildlife product), and iii) stipulated mandatory minimum sentences. Most Member States reported positive engagement processes with both Prosecutors and the Judiciary. In all cases this had been supported by partners (donors, UNODC, Interpol and/or NGOs) through engagement and training exercises.

Engaging with Prosecutors resulted in: i) improved communication in building cases, which led to deeper investigations into more complex cases, ii) more effective prosecutions and increased

sentencing, and iii) identified problems with prosecuting cases – which could arise from problems with specific prosecutors, or problems with prosecuting specific types of wildlife crimes. Problems could then be addressed with targeted remedial action – training, capacity building, or investigating possible corruption. In some Member States (e.g., Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique) the Wildlife Authority, Prosecution agency and a partner developed rapid reference guides for investigators and prosecutors – these help to identify which piece(s) of legislation to use, how to build the case and what evidence is needed from the outset.

Member States reported that developing closer relationships with Prosecutors has also helped to identify when there are problems with prosecuting cases, this may be problems with specific prosecutors, or problems with prosecuting specific types of wildlife crimes. This can then be remedied by targeted capacity building for a specific prosecutor or how to deal with a specific crime type. In some cases, the problem may have been the result of corruption or threats to the prosecutor, and then other appropriate remedial actions can be taken. In general, Member States reported that where this relationship has been built it has resulted in positive outcomes, even where there were significant problems and mistrust to overcome. In some cases, it had unexpected benefits, e.g., one Member State reported that a Senior Prosecutor had assisted with access to the national airport, which was a major trafficking hub, including supporting the use of sniffer dogs.

Member States also reported positive results when they engaged with the Judiciary. Typically, this was done separately to the engagement with the Prosecutors as the Judiciary were clear that they needed to be independent of the Prosecutors. Judicial engagement focused on providing understanding and depth to wildlife crime issues, including topics such as the role of wildlife in sustainable development, how wildlife crime plays a role in breaking down rule of law and governance in remote areas in particular, the role of biodiversity in general for key ecosystem services, and also the national and international heritage value of certain endangered and charismatic species. Sometimes just showing the challenges of working in a protected area (PA) and finding and arresting poachers had a huge impact alone. Member States reported that this resulted in improved awareness of the seriousness, scope and impacts of wildlife crime, improved case progression, improved sentencing, a better understanding, and acknowledgement of illegal wildlife trade as a form of organised crime, and the difficulty of tackling such crime. In some instances, this also resulted in general support from the judiciary acknowledging the importance of tackling wildlife crime in order to promote rule of law, good governance and thus the conditions for sustainable development.

#### Analysis for LEAP revision

However, despite these engagements and the general positive results they create, challenges remain. Several Member States reported instances of suspected corruption in both prosecutorial and judicial processes. This was best identified when systematic court monitoring was in place – which in all instances was funded by an external partner. In one Member State it was reported that finalising a key case of a transnational wildlife trafficker was continually delayed, despite overwhelming evidence. It was only through ongoing court monitoring and then active sharing of this information with national and international press that the court eventually came to making a decision – in the end convicting the trafficker. In another Member State, cases against two key wildlife traffickers were overturned on appeal because of weak evidence collection and poor prosecutorial preparation – something that capacity building and mentoring can help to overcome. Member States also reported challenges with

using national legislation designed to support transboundary law enforcement, e.g., Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), and extradition.

Finally, there is also currently a lot of emphasis on using additional tools to both investigate and prosecute wildlife traffickers, especially financial crime investigation tools which can help shed more light on the broader network involved and collect solid evidence for prosecution of financial as well as wildlife crimes – which may increase sanctions, including allowing asset seizure or forfeiture.

### 3.1.2 Minimization of wildlife crime and illegal trade

Member States reported varied success in tackling wildlife trafficking nationally. Those that had some success at disrupting, dismantling and sometimes successfully prosecuting organised wildlife traffickers nationally had one thing in common – some form of a trusted wildlife crime unit (WCU), which operated as an intelligence and investigations unit (IIU), and either led or coordinated the investigations which led to the successful cases. The common factors for successful WCUs seem to be that: i) it is small, builds internal trust, and is thus resilient to corruption, ii) in some way it is mandated for the law enforcement capacities required to investigate and arrest organised criminals, iii) it has good leadership, iv) it uses standard criminal investigations techniques to tackle organised crime (e.g., surveillance, undercover investigations, communications intercepts, etc.), iv) it works closely with the Prosecuting authority, and v) that it is fairly well resourced with adequate operational funds – typically this means a relationship with a trusted local partner that can access appropriate donor funds.

Member States with WCUs reported that once the WCU was functional it built trusted relationships with other national government agencies and provided a nexus for trusted relationships with neighbouring countries for information sharing information and sometimes joint cases on TOC networks.<sup>1</sup> Once WCUs and trusted relationships are in place, a few Member States reported that they are then building internal intelligence collection and analysis capacity which helps them to prioritise and target investigations to dismantle the most important organised wildlife crime networks. In one instance a Member State reported using intelligence analysis to identify and target corrupt officials facilitating wildlife crime. In another instance a Member State is using intelligence analysis to understand wildlife crime related financial flows to maximize the criminal charges and other sanctions possible. At this level SADC-TWIX<sup>2</sup> is also playing a positive role – providing Member States with a pool of resources to help them develop and build cases, as well as a secure and direct system to share non-intelligence information.

---

<sup>1</sup> A few specific examples include: i) Namibia reported the sharing of information and sometimes joint operations that led to the arrests of suspects in Botswana and Malawi and has led to the repatriation of suspects to Namibia from Botswana, ii) both Namibia and Malawi reported on good collaboration with Zambia, iii) Zambia reported intelligence sharing and joint operations with Malawi, iv) Tanzania reported successful working relationships with Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, and v) South Africa mentioned collaborative efforts to counter rhino poaching specifically, working with Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and eSwatini.

<sup>2</sup> SADC-TWIX is developed and managed by TRAFFIC on behalf of law enforcement agencies of SADC Member States. It is a tool to facilitate information exchange on IWT in the SADC region. It includes a secure mailing list that enables agencies to communicate in real time, and a website with useful resources such as training materials, identification guides and a seizure database. <https://www.sadc-twix.org>



All Member States reported that one significant challenge is finding trusted parties in other SADC Member States to engage with. They had hoped the SADC secretariat would support this through the proposed SADC Wildlife Crime Prevention and Coordination Unit. However, they recognised the difficulty of, i) finding funding to establish this unit, and ii) trying to engage and coordinate and 16 Member States. So, some of them wondered if a network of sub-regional platforms, each made up of four to five Member States, may work better, with SADC helping to provide direct contacts between Member States when required, and possibly supporting wider engagement, e.g., with other regional bodies. This model has been tested in the sub-regional four country CWC platform between Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia – functioning since 2018. These four Member States have signed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that allow their technical CWC teams to engage in regular meetings to share information on cases, trends and issues. This has helped to build trusted relationships which allows ad hoc bilateral engagement on specific cases as they arise.

### Analysis for LEAP revision

The approaches that Member States have adopted (outlined above) differ significantly from those proposed in the current SADC-LEAP – which calls for establishing intelligence sharing mechanisms both nationally and internationally, and for establishing broader collaboration bodies. It seems that first establishing small, trusted units with adequate resources and good leadership, then allowing these to develop a trusted network of relationships, has resulted in the sharing of intelligence and other information to build cases, both national and transnational. In some instances, national LEAP task forces, made up of multiple agencies, have been established to coordinate CWC work. It appears that, when functional, these provide useful support to WCU's – providing political support and supporting communication and coordination with other national bodies.

One key challenge will be leveraging the WCU model more broadly across the SADC region and trying to catalyse additional trusted relationships to dismantle more transnational organised wildlife crime groups. There also seems to be a need for improved capacity for intelligence collection and analysis, to allow for the prioritisation and targeting of the most important organised wildlife crime groups.

### **3.2 Integration of people and nature**

Member States reported varied success against this objective. In general Member States and civil society acknowledged the need for community engagement to garner support for wildlife conservation generally and PAs in particular, and ideally to develop co-management and stewardship models that result in improved conservation outcomes. In almost all cases, (descriptions of the exceptions follow), Member States did not provide sufficient information to fully evaluate the success of actions under this Objective to reduce wildlife crime. For example, two Member States reported on numbers of community engagement activities, which resulted in increased public awareness of wildlife laws, the negatives of wildlife crime and the benefits of wildlife conservation for local communities – be it through Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) systems or access to employment opportunities. However, they were unable to link number of community engagement activities, or increased awareness, to a real reduction in wildlife crime. This was a pervasive problem, except in the cases described below.

Namibia reported a direct relationship between their CBNRM systems, which give full ownership of wildlife to local people, and a reduction in wildlife crime. They found that the most well-established

conservancies consistently provided information and a supportive field environment which helped them to proactively mitigate rhino and elephant poaching. Both Tanzania and Zambia reported that in certain sites, where there is a direct relationship between benefits and a sense of ownership of the wildlife resource, community scouts are a vital source of information about elephant poachers, and in some instances with external operational support, play important roles within anti-poaching units (APUs).

In other instances, the link between community engagement and reduced wildlife crime is less clear. This is especially the case where societal structures have broken down and the relationship between individual people and the wildlife resource is distant or non-existent, or where human-wildlife conflict is high and tolerance to live with wildlife is low. These situations are exacerbated when the wildlife product available to be illegally harvested offer an exceptionally high return compared to other legal work opportunities in the area. In these instances, especially where there is a high human population and the returns from a wildlife economy would be miniscule per household, different approaches are needed.

#### Analysis for LEAP revision

More analysis is required to better understand the linkages between CBNRM and reduced wildlife crime, and the conditions that this occurs under. There are also many conditions under which CBNRM is not tenable and other strategies are needed to engage local communities in reducing wildlife crime. At a minimum these should start with developing a better understanding of the drivers and impacts of wildlife crime within local communities living in or around wildlife areas.

One example of another model is the IUCN's First Line of Defence (FLoD) program, which recognises the critical role that local communities living with wildlife play in combatting IWT, and the importance of understanding the perspectives of local people.<sup>3,4</sup> FLoD uses an adaptive approach to incorporate the complexity of tackling IWT through community engagement, and to ensure ongoing consideration of the critical assumptions made in determining counter-IWT strategies.<sup>5</sup> The FLoD methodology has been tested to demonstrate proof of concept in two cases studies in Kenya. Key lessons learnt showed that the FLoD methodology can provide an entry point for communities and strategy developers to engage, and that continuous engagement and feedback is vital for ensure buy-in and ownership by the local communities.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, in Decision 17 (SADC LEAP strategy) of the Joint meeting of SADC Ministers Responsible for Environment, Natural Resources and Tourism on 25 October 2019, the

---

<sup>3</sup> Roe D., Dublin, H., Niskanen L., Skinner, D., and Vishwanath, A. 2018. Local communities: the overlooked first line of defence for wildlife. IIED Briefing Paper. <https://pubs.iied.org/17455iied>

<sup>4</sup> IUCN. 2021. Local Communities - First Line of Defence against Illegal Wildlife Trade (FLoD). <https://www.iucn.org/regions/eastern-and-southern-africa/our-work/conservation-areas-and-species/local-communities-first-line-defence-against-illegal-wildlife-trade-flo-d>

<sup>5</sup> Roe, D., Biggs, D., Dublin, H., and Cooney, R. 2016. Engaging communities to combat illegal wildlife trade: a theory of change. IIED Briefing Paper. <https://pubs.iied.org/17348iied>

<sup>6</sup> Niskanen, L., Roe, D., Rowe, W., Dublin, H. and Skinner D. 2018. Strengthening local community engagement in combating illegal wildlife trade - Case studies from Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: IUCN. iii + 36p [https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/placeholder\\_document.pdf](https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/placeholder_document.pdf)

Ministers urged Member States to report on the implementation of FLoD guidelines as a tool to promote community engagement in the management of natural resources.<sup>7</sup>

In instances of high human population pressure, or where it's impossible for benefit sharing to function adequately for other reasons, then community crime prevention approaches need to be considered. These start by undertaking research to identify the local drivers of wildlife crime, which local community members are involved, and in what roles, and then builds an understanding of local needs and values. Thereafter project actions seek to align conservation values with local community values (e.g., relevant community values may be to reduce local corruption, or reduce local criminality, or improve physical security) rather than seek to recruit local community members to the conservation ethic.

### ***3.3 Sustainable trade and use of natural resources***

Member States representatives did not provide sufficient information to be able to review the implementation of this objective. However, several Member States reported that private sector tourism concessionaires played important roles in protecting and managing wildlife areas outside of national PAs, including helping to maintain connectivity. However, there are challenges in the relationships between tourism concessionaires and local people, and the concessionaires are not always recognised as legitimately being involved in wildlife law enforcement activities without government officers present. One opportunity to address this challenge is to leverage current improved knowledge in how to develop, negotiate and then implement Collaborative Management Partnership (CMP) agreements between governments and civil society, local communities and / or the private sector. A CMP agreement that lays out appropriate rights, roles and responsibilities can go a long way to legitimising the activities of private concessionaires.

#### *Analysis for LEAP revision*

It may be worth broadening this objective slightly to make it about sustainable use of natural resources and community-based approaches linked CWC activities. Current international conditions make sustainable trade in high value wildlife products unlikely, so broadening the focus to be more about sustainable use options in general may make more sense.

### ***3.4 Improvement and strengthening of field operations***

Member States reported significant improvements in field operations to combat wildlife poaching and the first levels of wildlife trafficking – where the product is moved from the poaching site to either the first buyer, or to where it is first stored before onward transport. Advances that led to improvements in anti-poaching field operations and a concomitant reduction in wildlife poaching came on several fronts. Member States reported the following, amongst others:

- CMPs – almost all PAs where there have been significant improvements in anti-poaching operations and PA law enforcement, or where key high value wildlife species are well-protected, are being managed under some form of CMP agreement between government and a civil society or private sector partner.

---

<sup>7</sup> Paragraph number 7.2.1.7 (ii) (b)

- Field leadership – successful PA law enforcement operations almost all chose to invest in field team leadership, be this through regular leadership training and / or specialist in-situ mentoring.
- Selection, basic training, and in-service training – successful anti-poaching results were achieved when attention was paid to selecting the right people, training them well and maintaining training standards with regular in-service training – both to keep their skills sharp, and as a motivational tool.
- K9 units – several PAs with successful operations have K9 units. These enable them to conduct roadblocks, searches, and sweeps looking for hidden weapons or illegal products.
- Law enforcement monitoring (LEM) – PAs with effective anti-poaching were typically using some form of LEM tool, allowing information from the field to be analysed to identify hotspots of activity, to ensure adequate and appropriate patrol coverage, and to generally enhance decision-making.
- Field intelligence collection, analysis, and feedback – several Member States had systems where field intelligence was not only used to make decisions locally but was also fed up centrally into the national Counter Wildlife Crime (CWC) intelligence system.

### **3.5 Other general feedback received on SADC LEAP implementation**

- Corruption was raised as a key driver of wildlife crime by four Member States, while the remaining eight Member States consulted all agreed that corruption needs to be addressed as a key wildlife crime issue. Corruption was identified as playing a role in wildlife crime at a PA level, at key transit points, in the investigations, prosecutorial and judicial processes, and sometimes at an institutional or systemic level.
- Several Member States reported an increase in bushmeat poaching and live pangolin trafficking and specifically as a key challenge going forward – see Section **Error! Reference source not found.** below.
- Some Member States noted that some of the seizures in their countries are goods that originated from other countries (e.g., ivory through Namibia, ivory and rhino horn through Zambia, and abalone through many landlocked SADC member states).

Some successes have been reported relating to this objective. Namibia reported the development of a national wildlife crime database that supports investigations and prosecutions. In addition, a well-established task force coordinating CWC activities and working with rapid response units has worked well operationally. Key to their success has been having a small but skilled task force, plus fast and flexible funding. The ability to quickly share intel is also a key factor and building trust is an important issue going forward. Continued adaptation and strengthening of field protections and operations was also highlighted. For example, in Malawi, an interagency forum exists to monitor CWC interventions and shares what works well and what is not working. Sub-committees are set up to deal with specific issues that have been raised.

## **4 Analysis of current wildlife crime trends in the SADC region**

### **4.1 Current status of wildlife crime in the region**

IWT within the SADC region continues to follow patterns like those observed over the last two decades, with the most seized species and commodities being elephant ivory, rhino horn, pangolin

scales, abalone, and large cats (pelts, bones).<sup>8,9,10</sup> There has been an increase in recorded seizures of other commodities that are also frequently found in illegal trade, yet not as commonly recorded or reported in the media until more recently, including hippopotamus teeth, turtle shells, live reptiles, African grey parrots, bushmeat and rosewood timber. Although there are numerous end markets depending on the species and commodity, most of the consumer demand for illegally traded wildlife from the SADC region lies within Southeast and East Asia.

The current trends in high demand, high value species/groups are described below individually.

#### 4.1.1 Rhino poaching and rhino horn trafficking

Black rhino, *Diceros bicornis*, and white rhino, *Ceratotherium simum*, occur throughout the SADC region – in nine of the sixteen SADC member states. Both species have been poached extensively in SADC rhino range states, mainly South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. With the highest populations of both species, South Africa is the main source for illegally traded horns, while Mozambique is the primary transit country – from where rhino horn is exported to consumer markets in Vietnam and China.<sup>11,12</sup>

Records of poached rhinos across Africa increased sharply from just 60 in 2006 to a peak of 1,349 in 2015. It is estimated that a total of 9,885 African rhinos have been poached in the decade from 2010 to the end of 2020.<sup>13</sup> However, since 2015 the number of poached rhinos recorded has declined year-on-year, with end-market prices for rhino horn also declining during this period.<sup>14</sup> In 2019, a total of 762 rhino were poached, similar to pre-2013 levels. Average wholesale prices of rhino horn in markets in Vietnam in 2017 were estimated to be USD18,881 per kg<sup>15</sup>, down from an estimated USD26,653 per kg<sup>16</sup> in 2015-16.

It is not clear whether the observed declines in poached rhino indicate a decrease in demand because of a contracting market, or whether legal stockpiles are being used to source and supply horn, or whether the overall reductions in rhino numbers just makes them harder to find. However, there have

---

<sup>8</sup> UNODC. 2020. World Wildlife Crime Report 2020: Trafficking in Protected Species. United Nations.

<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html>

<sup>9</sup> Aucoin, C. and Z. Donnerfeld. 2017. Guns, poison and horns: Organised wildlife crime in Southern Africa. ENACT Research Paper. Issue 1.

<sup>10</sup> TRAFFIC. 2019a. Africa's illegal wildlife trade: bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter.

<sup>11</sup> Emslie, R.H., Milliken, T., Talukdar, B., Ellis, S., Adcock, K., and M. Knight. 2016. A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN SSC) African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15).

<sup>12</sup> Moneron, S., Okes, N. and Rademeyer, J. 2017. Pendants, Powder and Pathways. TRAFFIC, East/Southern Africa Regional Office, Hatfield, Pretoria, South Africa.

<sup>13</sup> Save the Rhino. 2020. Poaching statistics. <https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino-info/poaching-stats/>

<sup>14</sup> Knight, M. 2020. African Rhino Specialist Group Chair report. Pachyderm No. 61.

<sup>15</sup> UNODC. 2020. World Wildlife Crime Report 2020: Trafficking in Protected Species. United Nations.

<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html>

<sup>16</sup> Wildlife Justice Commission. 2019. A Preliminary Analysis of Raw Rhino Horn Prices in Africa and Asia.

<https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FINAL-raw-rhino-horn-digital-1.pdf>

been some large seizures of rhino horn in 2019 (at least five incidents of over 100 rhino horns seized in the SADC region), suggesting that perhaps there has been some sourcing of horn from stockpiles.

Although the data is not yet available for all countries, estimates so far suggest that 435 rhinos were poached in 2020.<sup>17</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic will almost certainly have played a role in lower poaching figures in 2020 due to national lockdowns and restrictions on travel. In South Africa, anecdotal reports suggest that although there was an initial decline in the number of poached rhinos, as travel restrictions eased, rhino poaching has increased again. Between July 2020 and 17 July 2021, a total of 437.3kg of rhino horn has been seized during just five separate busts at South Africa's main airport.<sup>18</sup> Some of this may have been stockpiled horn from earlier poaching, but in general it suggests that there is still an illegal market and exports continue.

Another worrying trend in South Africa are the reports of significant increases in corruption amongst field rangers in the Kruger National Park (KNP).<sup>19</sup> This is attributed to concerted efforts by the organised poaching syndicates to recruit informers from the field ranger corps to help them find rhino and to avoid anti-poaching activity. This investment appears to be justified by the significant decline in rhino numbers in the KNP (70% over the last decade), making them harder to find, whilst anti-poaching methods have increased the risk of detection for rhino poachers.

*Summary information from the region:*

- Rhino crime declined in South Africa during the 2020 lock-down but poaching has increased since and there have been significant seizures – suggesting either that legal stockpiles are being accessed and exported illegally, stockpiles held from poaching are being exported, or there has been a substantial increase in poaching. There are serious concerns that corrupting government officials, especially in the protected areas, has become a key strategy of the poaching syndicates.
- Rhino poaching in Namibia decreased from an estimated 52 rhinos poached in 2019 to an estimated 31 rhinos poached in 2020. At the same time 21 horns were seized, up from 8 in 2019 and 13 in 2018, suggesting that enhanced law enforcement efforts focused on targeting and dismantling the organised crime networks trafficking high value wildlife products were bearing fruit.<sup>20</sup>
- NGO reports from Zimbabwe suggest that rhino poaching declined in 2020 compared to 2019.
- Press and NGO reports from Botswana suggest that rhino poaching has increased significantly in 2019-2020. This awaits official confirmation.

---

<sup>17</sup> Save the Rhino. 2020. Poaching statistics. <https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino-info/poaching-stats/>

<sup>18</sup> SARS. 2021. Media Release: Customs officers make massive bust of rhino horn weighing 160kg. <https://www.sars.gov.za/media-release/media-release-customs-officers-make-massive-bust-of-rhino-horn-weighing-160kg/>

<sup>19</sup> Keir, T. 2021. How rhino protectors in South Africa have become a major threat to the species. National Geographic. Published 6 July 2021. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/how-rhino-protectors-in-south-africa-became-threat-to-species>

<sup>20</sup> MEFT-NAMPOL. 2020. Combating Wildlife Crime in Namibia: Annual Report 2020. [https://www.met.gov.na/files/downloads/bb9\\_MEFT-NAMPOL\\_Annual-Report\\_Wildlife-Crime\\_2020\\_F-R1\\_210226\\_s.pdf](https://www.met.gov.na/files/downloads/bb9_MEFT-NAMPOL_Annual-Report_Wildlife-Crime_2020_F-R1_210226_s.pdf)

- Countries with smaller populations have all reported at least one year of no poaching – this includes eSwatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Mozambique and Zambia reported seizure of horns being trafficked from neighbouring countries.

#### 4.1.2 Elephant poaching and elephant ivory trafficking

Estimates of ivory trafficking and elephants poached across Africa are provided through a combination of the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and the CITES MIKE programme. MIKE estimates are based on the proportion of illegally killed elephants from carcasses found and recorded in the field, while ETIS monitors law enforcement records for seizures of elephant ivory or other elephant specimens reported by individual countries.

The MIKE estimates of poaching pre-2014 identified Central, East and West African countries as primary concern for unsustainable poaching levels (MIKE, 2014). However, elephant poaching for ivory increased substantially in Southern Africa after 2008: MIKE poaching estimates increased between 2008 and 2011 (MIKE, 2014) but have since declined, following the overall slowly decreasing trend in estimates of elephant poaching seen in Central, Eastern and West Africa (MIKE, 2020).

ETIS seizure records showed a peak in 2011 in the number of ivory poaching cases on the continent overall (1,898 cases) and a peak in 2013 in the weight of ivory seized (67,339 kg) (ETIS, 2020).

Table 4: Total number and weight (kg) of ivory seizure cases reported to ETIS, 2008 – 2019. Source: ETIS, 2020.

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Number	534	1,355	1,346	1,898	1,378	1,636	1,352	1,456	1,248	1,229	1,007	896
Weight	6,858	34,298	26,511	51,633	41,689	67,339	40,816	44,052	38,834	38,848	29,649	42,479

The **TableError! Reference source not found.** shows that whilst the number of recorded seizures seems to be declining, the total weight of ivory seized is not really declining and remains worryingly high at around 40 tonnes per annum. In 2019, despite a relatively low number of elephants recorded poached, there were three exceptionally large seizures, all of which consisted of raw ivory: i) a 7,482 kg seizure in China, ii) a 8,795 kg seizure in Singapore, and iii) a 9,104 kg seizure in Vietnam.

An important trend in elephant poaching and elephant ivory trafficking in particular has been the geographic shift of poaching and trafficking on the continent. The initial surge in elephant poaching this century started in Central Africa, resulting in an estimated 62% decline in forest elephant numbers from 2002-2011 (Maisels *et al.*, 2013). Shortly thereafter elephant poaching surged in Tanzania, which held Africa’s second largest population of savanna elephants at the time. Genetic analyses of 22 large seizures between 2006 and 2014 showed that between 86% and 93% of the savanna elephant ivory seized was predominantly assigned to south-eastern Tanzania and adjacent northern Mozambique; 86% to 93% of the forest elephant ivory from that period was predominantly assigned to the Tridom in northern Gabon, Republic of Congo and south-western CAR (Wasser *et al.*, 2015). From 1998 to 2014 Tanzania was the primary country for export of ivory from Africa with Mozambique fourth (EIA,

2020). Linked to this, during the five years 2009 to 2014 Tanzania lost 60% of its elephants to poaching and Mozambique just under 50% (IUCN, 2016). However, this pattern has now changed significantly, and from 2015-2019 Nigeria was the primary country for export of ivory from Africa, closely followed by DRC, with Mozambique sixth and Tanzania eighth (EIA, 2020).

The shift of elephant ivory trafficking from Tanzania to Mozambique and then to Nigeria seems to have been largely brought about by the impact of specialist WCUs, functioning in ways that make them resilient to corruption, disrupting and sometimes dismantling the ivory trafficking networks and changing the perceived risk to operating from that location. Specific examples include:

1. The Shuidong network explicitly mentioned that their move from Tanzania to northern Mozambique and then to Nigeria was a result of law enforcement pressure and the closing down of the corrupt networks that they relied on. This network has since been dismantled by actions led by China Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau (EIA, 2017; EIA, 2019).
2. The Kromah cartel – dismantled by a multinational investigation that included the USFWS office of international law enforcement, the US-DEA, and specialist investigations units from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi (Dept Justice, 2019; Morris, 2019). This network relied on corrupt networks for protection in multiple locations where it shipped its goods from, but specifically in Uganda where Moazu Kromah was based and had previously evaded prosecution despite being arrested with 1.7 tonnes of ivory in his house.
3. The arrest of Chupi Mateso and thereafter six related ivory traffickers in northern Mozambique, resulting in an almost immediate cessation of ivory trafficking from Pemba port despite other illicit flows increasing in the region (Nelson, 2020). This local impact on ivory trafficking was in spite of the Attorney-General of Mozambique opting to expel Mateso to Tanzania for prosecution as she was so concerned about the levels of corrupt protection amongst law enforcement authorities he had built for himself in northern Mozambique.
4. The dismantling of the Lin network in Malawi, which was the culmination of significant work by Malawi to build its capacity to tackle wildlife trafficking. This, after a 2015 internal review revealed that Malawi was being used as a major transit hub for illegal wildlife products (DNPW, 2015), and in 2016 Malawi was identified by CITES as a country of ‘primary concern’ and Southern Africa’s principal transit hub for international trafficking syndicates (CITES, 2016).

Similar examples exist in Zambia and Namibia, which have also reported significant declines in elephant poaching after establishing, or strengthening, specialist intelligence and investigations units.

International political support has played a major role in driving the momentum which paved the way for the law enforcement driven successes highlighted above, but also resulted in policy changes implemented by consumer countries and more structured action plans by range states. Examples of these include:

- The African Elephant Action Plan (2011) which has the objective of ‘Reduced Illegal Killing of Elephants and Illegal Trade in Elephant Products’ and proposes to do this through strengthening the capacity of law enforcement; harmonising national policies across range states where possible; strengthening the laws relevant to the conservation and management of African elephants; and strengthening the enforcement of laws pertaining to trade in ivory and other elephant products. Funded by the African Elephant Fund, this plan’s successes were mainly in countries outside of SADC, but nevertheless included the training of enforcement personally in Ethiopia and Ghana in



the conduct of anti-poaching missions; making Gabon self-sufficient in the traceability analysis of ivory; and the arrest of 114 people in Nigeria for poaching (AEF, 2019). However, it's worth noting that these are output level achievements and do not necessarily reflect success in achieving the actual objective.

- The Zimbabwe National Elephant Management Plan (2015-2020) links to the African Elephant Action Plan as well as the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement and includes action plans that propose the establishment of highly trained, rapid response anti-poaching units for areas under threat; as well as informer networks, improved investigation and prosecution of crimes through capacity building in the judiciary and enhanced collaboration both within country (social involvement in law enforcement) and between countries (transboundary collaboration in law enforcement).
- The Tanzania Elephant Management Plan (2010 – 2015) tackles ivory poaching through their objective regarding strengthening law enforcement.
- The KAZA Strategic Planning Framework forms part of a suite of measures towards the “harmonisation of policies, legislation and practice in the management and sustainable use of natural resources as provided for in the KAZA TFCA Treaty” and includes “the reduction of illegal killing and trade in elephants and elephant products” as one of its four objectives (KAZA, 2019).

Seizure data reflect that Vietnam and China have been the primary international market destinations for elephant ivory in the last five years (UNODC, 2020). The banning of the domestic ivory trade in China in 2017 (Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020a), a similar ban in the USA in 2016 (2016; Federal Register Vol. 81 No. 108), and a freeze on re-exports of raw ivory from the EU (COM/2016/087) have been significant policy changes by international ivory market countries that have re-shaped demand. In 2018, Hong Kong adopted a phased law banning the trade in elephant ivory but as the full implementation will only take place by the end of 2021, the impact of this is yet to be seen (Hong Kong, 2021). Singapore plans to follow suit and ban the domestic trade in ivory from September 2021. The EU has, in 2021, proposed to further their ban on ivory trade with limited exceptions (European Commission, 2021).

Finally, current information gleaned from investigators suggests three key trends, 1) the price of ivory is declining all along the value chain, 2) ivory traders nonetheless are still buying and stockpiling ivory, and 3) some of the key traffickers who buy on behalf of Asian ivory traders have relocated their operations to DRC and Nigeria and are reputed to be buying ivory that is poached in Botswana and smuggled north through Zambia and Angola into DRC.

#### Summary:

- There has been a continental decline in recorded elephant poaching, although large seizures of elephant ivory still occur.
- Where previously significant volumes of ivory were being trafficked out of East Africa (Tanzania and Mozambique in particular), since 2015-17 this seems to have largely shifted to Nigeria and DRC.
- Targeted law enforcement action to disrupt and dismantle the ivory trafficking networks in key countries (Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Namibia and Mozambique in particular) seems to have changed the perceived risk of trafficking ivory out of these countries.

- Political support and policy changes, especially in demand countries, seems to have played a role in reducing demand too, and the price of ivory all along the value chain has reduced significantly.
- Current information from investigators suggests that: 1) the price of ivory is declining all along the value chain, 2) ivory traders nonetheless are still buying and stockpiling ivory, and 3) key traffickers have relocated operations to DRC and Nigeria and are reputed to be buying ivory that is poached in Botswana and smuggled north through Zambia and Angola into DRC.

#### 4.1.3 Poaching of large carnivores and trafficking of their body-parts

Legal and illegal trade in large cats occurs throughout the SADC region in the form of lion and leopard skins, bone, teeth and claws. Analyses of seizure data suggest that there may be a difference in the predominant commodities in illegal trade in East-Southern Africa (claws, teeth, bone items) compared with West Africa (skins), potentially indicating different sub-regional trade dynamics in carnivore trade (TRAFFIC, 2019).

Within the SADC region to date, the primary concern has been the lion bone trade, although lion teeth and claws also appear in a number of small seizures at airports. Legal trade in lion bone has occurred since 2007, with predominantly South Africa, but also Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia and Zambia all reporting some exports of lion products. The trade in bones and other body parts for traditional medicine, both within Africa and Asia, was identified as an emerging threat in 2014 (Everatt et al. 2019; Williams et al. 2015). Mole and Newton (2021) notes that “numerous seizures of illegal lion body parts across various African countries where wild populations exist, along with increased reports of lion poaching incidences, suggest that these trades may pose a significant threat to several populations across Africa (2004–2014 data from UNEP-WCMC in Funston et al., 2016). Those populations thought to be most at risk are in East Africa, where lion populations have decreased by almost 60% in the past two decades (Bauer et al., 2016).”

In South Africa, regulations allowing lion bone trade from captive breeding facilities have complicated matters, especially from 2017 to 2019. In 2017, South Africa introduced an annual quota on lion bones that allowed a certain number of skeletons to be exported from captive breeding facilities. In effect, this meant that in 2018 and 2019, a total of 800 whole skeletons per year could be exported from South Africa from registered captive breeding facilities provided that they could present proof of origin through a permitting system. There has been concern that illegal exports (of not only lions, but other carnivores) of bone from wild lions can be disguised through the legal trade (Williams et al. 2021). For example, in 2019 officials seized 342kg of lion bones (equivalent to 38 lions) that were wrapped in aluminium foil in crates and reportedly mis-declared – it remains uncertain whether the bones were from captive bred or wild lions. This legal trade of lion bones may also allow for poached lion bones to be laundered into it at the market end of the value chain as well.

However, in May 2021 South Africa announced its decision to end the captive lion industry, including the commercial trade in lion bones. The impact that this will have on wild populations of lions, and whether it will put them at greater risk of poaching, is uncertain, especially as international demand for lion bone seems likely to continue.

#### 4.1.4 Pangolin scale trafficking and the live pangolin market

Pangolins are referred to as the most trafficked mammal in the world due to the high demand for their meat and scales by markets predominantly in Southeast and East Asia. There are two specific markets for pangolin, 1) their scales which are used in certain Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) treatments (e.g., to unblock blood clots, promote blood circulation, to aid lactation and for certain other gynaecological diseases), and 2) their meat, which is a prized delicacy in certain parts of China and Vietnam. Pangolin scale trafficking is analysed and reviewed first below. However, it appears that a market for live pangolins has developed in southern Africa, and this is then reviewed after the section on pangolin scales below.

Analysis of global seizure data of smuggled pangolin scales from 2016 to 2019 shows a significant and rapid increase in the volume being trafficked. An estimated 206.4 tonnes of pangolin scales were intercepted and confiscated from 52 seizures in this period, nearly two-thirds of the tonnage seized (132.1 tonnes) was detected in the last two years (2018- 2019). In 2019, the average weight of a single pangolin scale shipment was 6.2 tonnes, compared with 2.2 tonnes three years earlier (Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020b).

Prior to 2010, much of this trade constituted Asian pangolin species, but later shifted towards African species (Heinrich et al. 2017). In 2017, analyses of seizure data showed that relative to Asian pangolin species, the proportion of international trafficking incidents in African pangolins appeared to be increasing (Heinrich et al. 2017). There have been numerous large seizures of shipments of pangolin scales in Hong Kong and a few other key port cities in Asia – most having originated in West and Central Africa, but also some from Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia. The shift of demand from Asian to African pangolin species is postulated to be the result of declining populations of Asian pangolin species, coupled with growing economic ties between Asia and Africa which have facilitated access to African species and reduced transport costs.

Within Africa there have been geographic shifts in the export sites of pangolin scales. From 1998 to 2014, as the pangolin trade from Africa grew, Cameroon had the most pangolin scale seizures linked to it (2,861 kg), followed by Kenya (1,797 kg) and Uganda (1,121 kg) (EIA, 2020). From 2015 and 2019, there has been a major shift in volume and export site, with large seizures linked to Nigeria (167,594 kg), DRC (40,373 kg) and Cameroon (23,242 kg), followed by Uganda (9,199 kg), Tanzania (6,796 kg) and Republic of Congo (5,598 kg) (EIA, 2020).

Pangolin scales are largely destined for medicinal markets throughout SE and East Asia, including China, Vietnam, Thailand, Lao PDR and Myanmar (Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020b). WJC (2020b) note however, that a “potential change in market demand may soon be realised, following the announcement in China that from January 2020, its national insurance will no longer cover medicines containing pangolin products”. Worth mentioning are at least two known attempts, using Chinese research funding, to establish pangolin farming centres in Africa (in Uganda and Mozambique) – despite their being clear evidence that captive pangolin breeding and husbandry is almost impossible except, even under the most favourable conditions (Challender *et al.*, 2019). Both of these centres have been closed over concerns about laundering of wild pangolins and their derivatives as captive-bred, as well as irregularities in the licensing process in each instance.

There are increasing reports of a demand for live pangolins in many countries in southern Africa. This is evident from seizure data, reports and discussions with Member States counter wildlife trafficking leads (Wildlife Trade Portal; Chelin, 2019). The local market for live pangolins has been reported as especially concerning in Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Angola, Mozambique and Zambia have recorded smaller local markets – and Mozambique in particular has reported a regular supply of live pangolins across its borders into both Malawi and Zimbabwe. Initial reports were that these live pangolins were largely for consumption by local Asian expatriate communities in these countries. There was speculation that the scales may be finding their way into the illicit flows to wherever they are stockpiled before being shipped to Asia, or that individual travellers may be carrying them back to Asia in their personal luggage. However, there is a developing concern that the demand may be to supply developing TCM centres locally in these countries – centres which are providing treatments to the expatriate Asian populations and are being developed to cater as alternative medicine centres for local African populations. These TCM centres are developing as part of the Chinese government’s policy to promote TCM internationally. This could signify a possible growth in domestic markets for pangolin scales in SADC countries, with the meat then being used in local restaurants.

#### Summary:

- Pangolin scale trafficking from Africa to Asia has increased substantially in the last three years, and whilst the major volumes are exiting Nigeria, DRC and Cameroon, some SADC countries have also seen large shipments smuggled out. It also appears that the scales are coming from multiple supply sites before being stockpiled and conglomerated into these large shipments. Current information from investigators suggests that large scale buyers for this trafficking market have been active in many countries in the region.
- There is a local market for live pangolins in a number of SADC countries. Whilst this may have initially been driven by expatriate Asian populations for their local consumption and restaurant trade, there is now an increasing concern that this is developing into local demand for pangolin scales to feed developing local TCM centres.

#### 4.1.5 Abalone poaching and trafficking

South African Abalone is a highly sought-after endemic marine mollusc harvested both legally and illegally in South Africa, with almost all the catch being exported to predominantly Asian markets where it is consumed as a high-value delicacy (Okes et al. 2018). It was once a legal fishery with a large quota, but overharvesting led to declines in the population and reduced quotas to the point that today, only a small wild caught quota of 96 tonnes is allowed. Legal farming operations also supply the demand in market destinations but mainly in the form of live and canned abalone; and together with the small wild caught quota this equates to approximately 2,000 tonnes per year – legal farming operations have increased significantly in production over the last five years or so. Estimates suggest that an annual average of 2,174 tonnes of abalone has been poached per year over the period 2000 – 2016 (Okes et al. 2018), with current estimates for 2017 – 2019 suggesting even higher quantities (TRAFFIC, unpubl. data). As abalone is not listed on CITES, and not subject to any regulations outside of South Africa, transport to market destinations mainly in Hong Kong is usually through South Africa’s neighbouring countries as once it crosses South Africa’s border, the poached abalone can be legally transported.

The illicit trade in abalone has always been associated with other illicit economies, and poaching is linked to the same gangs who control local drugs and extortion markets at the main sites where poaching occurs. The trafficking of abalone is also linked to drugs trafficking, in the past abalone was bartered for precursor chemicals to synthetic drugs, and whilst this seems to no longer be the case, abalone still flows through the same vulnerable transport hubs as drugs and other illicit products (Eligh, 2021).

Apart from domestic measures to tackle this illicit trade, greater collaboration within the region regarding information sharing and legal frameworks is needed to assist SADC countries in restricting the movement of abalone through their ports (Okes et al. 2018). Recent information suggests that other SADC countries are recently becoming more aware of the issue of abalone trafficking and are engaging with South Africa on how to tackle the problem, as well as trying to better understand its possible linkages with other illicit flows as it enters and leaves their territories.

#### 4.1.6 Timber trafficking

Timber trafficking from the SADC region appears to be largely unaddressed, despite there being a strong policy and institutional framework that includes CITES and the SADC Protocol on Forestry. Corruption is a major challenge to combatting timber trafficking – driven by the high value of timber and the enormous profits to be gained from illegally exporting Africa’s hardwoods. In Mozambique, EIA (2013) exposed massive discrepancies in trade records between Mozambique and China and caught Chinese timber company owners on video describing the relationships that they had with senior government officials that allowed their containers of illegal timber to be exported. This report recognised weak forest governance and corruption as the main facilitators of both the illegal logging and timber smuggling. In southern Tanzania, Milledge (2007) reported that ‘more than half of the 28 logging companies studied had close links to senior forest or government officials. In some rural areas, the involvement of village leaders in the timber trade has led to an unfair distribution of profits, and at higher levels, there are many examples of self-dealing, nepotism and cronyism’.

Despite a number of SADC countries having legislation that bans the export of some species, or requires the timber to be worked and have value added domestically, there are numerous incidences where timber crosses into a neighbouring country with more lax legislation, or opportunities for corruption, and is then exported illegally from there. For example, timber from Tanzania, exported through Mozambique (Milledge, 2007) and timber from Zambia which is illegal to export from Mozambique, falsely on entry and then exported from Mozambique as Zambian timber but of the wrong species<sup>21</sup>. Key countries of concern regarding timber trafficking include Angola, DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In some instances timber flows through countries unimpeded because of lax inspection and no concern about the legal or harvesting regime in the country of origin, for example, Namibia continues to be a conduit for timber being harvested in Angola, DRC and Zambia (Nott et al. 2020). Analyses by Nott et al. (2020) show that “in the past, the main timber species exploited commercially from these areas were limited to Kiaat and Zambezi Teak with unsustainable harvesting and export of Mukula *Pterocarpus tinctorius* from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported more recently.”

---

<sup>21</sup> <https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/6439-carta-ao-leitor-mocambique-abraca-o-contrabando-transnacional-de-madeira>

The unsustainable extraction of timber has a negative impact on climate change resilience and environmental security and can undermine sustainable development by reducing opportunities for local sustainable livelihoods. Climate change resilience is undermined by the destruction of critical forests which act as carbon sinks. Environmental security is impacted in many ways, but a simple example is the devastating impact that Cyclone Idai had in Central Mozambique in 2019 – as a result of the upstream catchment areas having been denuded of their woodlands and associated wetlands, all of the rainfall from the cyclone flowed unimpeded down the rivers, destroying farmland and ultimately large parts of the city of Beira<sup>22</sup>.

#### 4.2 An analysis of emerging trends and threats

In undertaking data collection and analysis for this section it became apparent that a lot of the trends and threats that are considered ‘emergent’ have in fact been around for a while. It may be that as our abilities to tackle the IWT matures we become more aware of the diversity of species and wildlife products being illegally traded, and the diversity of markets as well.

However, at the same time it does appear that this is a real growth of IWT, possibly driven by a number of factors, including online trade and online social media driven demand, the increasing ease of smuggling products within the vast global trade network, and increasing wealth in certain sectors of society that drive demand. This increase in volume of the IWT, and the concomitant increase in diversity of species and wildlife products being traded is evident indirectly through the change in the media and government reporting of IWT. Although the recording of seizures is dependent on many factors, including effort and reporting, it does give relative insight into the prevalence of IWT, and how the current understanding of wildlife crime in the region has grown to encompass more diverse species and routes.

For example, over the last eight years, the number of reported seizures and IWT records captured in the Wildlife Trade Portal<sup>23</sup> as having occurred in a SADC Member State has increased from 194 in 2013, to 484 in 2017 and more recently 376 in 2020 despite a global pandemic (Figure 1, Wildlife Trade Portal). Similarly, the taxonomic diversity of wildlife commodities seen in the IWT can be seen through the number of distinct orders and families represented in incidents involving SADC Member States between 2013 and 2020 (Figure 2). The number of other




Figure 2: The number of taxonomic orders and families represented in incidents related to the IWT (e.g., seizures, illegal harvesting), 2013 – 2020 (Source: Wildlife Trade Portal)

<sup>22</sup> <https://theconversation.com/tropical-cyclone-idai-the-storm-that-knew-no-boundaries-113931>

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.wildlifetradeportal.org>

countries involved in these incidents also reflects the scale of the problem regarding routes and destination markets (Figure 3).

The large number of recent reports by the wildlife trade specialist NGO, TRAFFIC, specifically its monitoring of traded species and activities within Africa, is also evidence of the growing challenge and the resources dedicated to understanding and generating knowledge for policy makers on IWT. For example, since 2015 a total of 43 publications on wildlife trade challenges within Africa have been published (in addition to the global, bi-annual TRAFFIC Bulletin dedicated exclusively to wildlife trade issues) compared to only 12 in the period 2010 – 2015 ([www.traffic.org/publications](http://www.traffic.org/publications)).




Figure 3: Countries involved as either source, transit or destination countries of IWT incidents occurring in SADC Member States, 2013 – 2020 in total (darker shade indicates higher number of incidents associated with that country). Source: Wildlife Trade Portal

The changing dynamics of the IWT are driven by a number of factors. Firstly, new markets, species in trade and routes may emerge through opportunistic sourcing and operational adaptations by organised criminal networks already operating in the region, some of whom may already specialise in wildlife, or some of whom may enter the IWT as an add on to existing trafficking operations in other markets (e.g., drugs, weapons). Organised criminal networks are opportunistic and adapt quickly to market changes and opportunities, as well as to operational shifts in response to law enforcement. Second, non-organised wildlife trade by collectors is continuously evolving and can be difficult to track due to the potentially smaller quantities, lesser-known species and a relatively poor understanding of the trade. The collector trade seems to be evolving rapidly at the moment with the proliferation of exotic pets being displayed on social media platforms like Instagram. Third, market demand may be impacted by various factors, including supply, for example, as legal trade becomes more regulated due to declines in populations of certain species, some of this trade may be driven underground or displaced. The collecting and sharing of information are key to ensuring a proactive understanding of how, when and where such activities take place. Here, we provide a summary of some of the main themes found to be emerging in the recent years as potential threats that we need to think about when revising the SADC LEAP strategy.

#### 4.2.1 Potential substitution species

As wild animal populations decline due to overharvesting for the illegal trade, traffickers do (and will continue to) source alternatives that meet a similar demand or niche market as the species in decline. For example, within the SADC region, hippo teeth are thought to be used as an alternative to elephant ivory for carving – although this is difficult to confirm. Legal trade in hippo teeth is permitted from some countries while others have quotas in place and may restrict trade in some way (e.g., teeth must be taken as trophies, the ivory must be worked) (TRAFFIC, 2019). Moneron and Drinkwater (2021) found that the legal trade in hippo ivory was mainly hippo teeth exported from east and southern

African range states to Asia, Europe, and North America, which was then re-exported to countries within the EU, Hong Kong, Turkey and the US. They reported that between 2009 and 2018, exporting countries reported trading 24,749kg and 39,977 specimens of hippo ivory, while importing countries/territories reported trading 36,463kg and 22,755 specimens<sup>24</sup>. Discrepancies in import and export figures can be cause for concern or may indicate a lack of consolidation of traded quantities. Either way, trends in the legal trade can provide insights into the market demand for the product and identify potential illegal routes. Records show that seizures of hippo teeth have mainly occurred in Tanzania (e.g., 148 teeth seized in 2016) and more recently in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Namibia (e.g., in 2021 two men were arrested in Namibia with two hippo teeth and with elephant ivory – data obtained on individual incidents from the Wildlife Trade Portal). Seizures of hippo teeth will often include elephant ivory and/or other commonly traded illicit wildlife products including lion, pangolin and occasionally rhino horn (Wildlife Trade Portal).

#### 4.2.2 Emerging species: legal and illegal

The legal trade in species and commodities provide an understanding of consumer markets and their sources, and thus can provide insight into potential emerging species or commodities in the illegal trade. In addition, the legal trade can be used as a guise for laundering illegal products. Similar or lookalike species or commodities from illegal sources can enter consumer markets undetected through the misuse of permits and/or the misdeclaration of species – both of which are confounded by the challenge of poor species identification for many processed forms. Lastly, loopholes or inconsistencies in legal frameworks across the region pose challenges for the restriction of movement of illegally sourced products through the continent. Consistent monitoring of legal trade in few key commodities and collaborative engagement at the policy level will assist in being proactive and countering these types of emerging threats.

Some important points to consider are:

- Seahorses: as all species of seahorse are listed on CITES Appendix II, legal trade in live, dried or other commodities of these species would require CITES documentation. Incidents of illegal trade in seahorses are known to occur within the SADC region: recently the Mozambican authorities arrested a Chinese citizen living in Mozambique in possession of 8.4kg of dried seahorse. Louw and Bürgener (2020) found that Madagascar was the source of the highest illegal quantities of seahorses exported from Africa. According to TRAFFIC, there is evidence of seahorse imports from South Africa to Hong Kong, but no evidence of CITES export records from South Africa. These kinds of mismatches in trade records can help to identify illegal trade, suggesting that the seahorse trade should be further investigated.
- Policy differences between member states in the SADC region can result in legal loopholes which are exploited either opportunistically or at a more organised level by criminal networks. These differences provide an opportunity for illicit products to be displaced or re-routed through other countries. Abalone is an example (see section above), as is the trade in sea cucumbers. TRAFFIC noted that the disparity in laws regulating fisheries management in Tanzania, Kenya, and Zanzibar has resulted in illegal sea cucumbers from Tanzania being transported and mixed with legal, farmed sea cucumber and then exported (Louw and Bürgener, 2020; Martin and Floros, 2020). Similarly, policy differences which allow the export of live animals from Zanzibar, a trade which is currently

---

<sup>24</sup> CITES trade data



banned from mainland Tanzania, have raised concerns about the laundering of leopard tortoises and possible other reptile species from mainland Tanzania through Zanzibar (Nelson, 2020).

#### 4.2.3 Human wildlife conflict, retaliatory killings and related concerns

Human wildlife conflict can lead to retaliatory killings of species such as elephants and lions in SADC Member States. Demand for body parts, however, can potentially incentivise conflict related killings (Everatt et al. 2019). In South Africa, Everatt et al. (2019) noted that in the case of lions killed in response to livestock predation, nearly half of the carcasses had body parts missing; and in Tanzania, there is evidence to suggest that lion trade is predominantly domestic, used for traditional purposes and sourced from retaliatory killings (Mole and Newton, 2021). There is increasing concern that poison is being used in retaliatory lion killings in northern Mozambique and Tanzania<sup>25</sup> (c.f. Mole and Newton, 2021).

As human settlements continue to encroach on PAs throughout the region, it is expected that human-wildlife conflict will intensify, and pressure on resources will increase. The impacts of COVID-19 are yet to be fully understood but are likely to include an increase in bushmeat poaching as economic pressure and lack of opportunities for economic development intensify.

#### 4.2.4 Marine species in demand in Southeast and East Asia

Several high value marine products are sought after in Asian markets due to their value as a status food or symbol of wealth - many of which are sourced from coastal SADC countries (Louw, 2020). Specifically, shark fin, abalone, fish maw<sup>26</sup> and sea cucumber are considered part of the 'big four' east Asian delicacies of the sea, part of the same niche market (Rahman & Yussof, 2017).

Two species of CITES listed sea cucumber occur in coastal SADC countries (*Holothuria fuscogoliva* and *H. nobulis* in South Africa, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania) where several sea cucumber fisheries operate. In a rapid assessment of the trade in sea cucumber from Africa to Asia, TRAFFIC identified a few key issues in relevant SADC countries (Louw and Bürgener, 2020):

- Mozambique – increasing sea cucumber exports; highest exporter of dried sea cucumbers in Africa since 2019. High levels of under reporting of export volumes.
- Madagascar – High levels of under reporting of export volumes and illegal harvesting taking place.

---

<sup>25</sup> From discussions with the LATF and ANAC.

<sup>26</sup> *Fish maws* are the swim bladders of fresh and saltwater fishes that are dried and used in Chinese cuisine and traditional medicine. Fish maws are sourced in Asia from all over the globe, and recently have been found to be imported from African countries, including SADC coastal states (Constant et al. 2020). Hong Kong is a major transit hub and the world's largest importer and re-exporter of dried seafood including fish maw (Clarke, 2002). A recent report assessing the trade in fish maw from Africa to Asia shows that Hong Kong specifically has reported one fifth of its fish maw imports from African countries – notably Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Although fish maw trade is not illegal, the legal trade is associated with the transport of illicit wildlife commodities, and there is growing evidence of illegal fishing for Nile Perch to supply the maw trade from Lake Victoria (Constant et al. 2020). As there are minimal trade measures relating to fish maw, they are an easy cover for illegal shipments of ivory, other illicit dried seafood like shark fin and abalone, as well as pangolin scales (Constant et al. 2020). In South Africa, it has been noted that fish maws have been confiscated with seahorses and illicit dried abalone but are not recorded due to a lack of awareness of the species involved and/or legality of the product (Constant et al. 2020).

- Tanzania – Different sea cucumber management regimes created a trade network where smuggled sea cucumbers from mainland Tanzania (ban) entered legal trade in Zanzibar (no ban).
- Seychelles – high levels of under reporting of sea cucumber export volumes.

Overall, there is poor monitoring of sea cucumbers and fish maws in Africa. The fact that they belong to the same niche market as shark fin, and that the fish maw trade follows a similar trajectory as international shark fin trade (Louw et al. 2020), suggests that they may be important species/commodities to monitor for illegal trade and to ensure the sustainability of legal fisheries and markets.

#### 4.2.5 Confluence of markets, sources and routes

Similar routes are increasingly being used to traffic large quantities of a range of illicit wildlife products. For example, UNODC (2020), reported that traders would often use the same route to export and import pangolin scales as they do ivory. This is also evident from seizure data, where known pangolin seizures have commonly been found together with ivory in large containers being shipped from Nigeria to Hong Kong, showing that there is a high level of convergence between these products (TRAFFIC, 2019a; EIA, 2020). UNODC (2020) notes that traders take advantage of weak border controls and security challenges in northern Uganda, DRC and South Sudan to offload collected scales, and traffickers will also store stockpiles of scales in countries where wildlife crime law enforcement is weak before moving the scales for immediate sale to buyers in more high-risk locations (UNODC, 2020). The large quantities seized also suggests that such stockpiling is occurring. For example, in January 2021, Nigerian Customs Services confiscated 8.8 tonnes of pangolin scales, elephant tusks and bones from other species concealed together in a 20ft container falsely declared as furniture materials at Apapa port in Lagos, destined for Vietnam (EIA, 2021).

As law enforcement efforts in the region adapt to evolving routes and points of vulnerability, and subsequently take action to address these vulnerabilities at known transport hubs, so the organised trafficking networks adapt and shift their routes or displace their illicit activities and networks. For example, according to the EIA (2020) there has been a recent shift in the flow of ivory and pangolin scales to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as both a transit and exit point for illegal consignments. Prior to 2015, the amount of seized pangolin scales was reported as 2kg and elephant ivory as 7,800 kg (EIA, 2020). Since then, in the period 2015 – 2019, the quantity of seized pangolin scales linked to the DRC exceeds 40,000 kg and elephant ivory almost 30,000kg (EIA, 2020). Together, Nigeria and the DRC were the source for 94% of total pangolin seizures in the last decade (Omifolaji et al. 2020). In 2019, authorities in Singapore seized a record haul of 11.9 metric tons of pangolin scales and 8.8 metric tons of elephant ivory. The shipment of three containers came from the DRC and was en route to Vietnam<sup>27</sup>. The importance of the DRC as a major transit country has been emphasised by numerous studies and agencies (Nkoke et al. 2017; UNODC, 2020). Besides pangolin and ivory, other illicit wildlife products have been found to be transported through the DRC on route to Nigeria for export. Rhino horn has been seized in Kinshasa in 2015 and in 2019, for example, en route to Vietnam and Singapore despite no rhino being present in the DRC (TRAFFIC, 2019b).

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.traffic.org/news/singapore-makes-record-breaking-african-ivory-and-pangolin-seizure/>

#### 4.2.6 Pet trade

The trade in live animals for pets is increasing<sup>28</sup> (Janssen, 2021; Nelson and Cochrane, 2020) and is an emerging issue, particularly regarding CITES listed species that are traded legally to countries which offer no legal protection for these species nor traceability systems of animals traded. Small cats, reptiles and birds are just some of the species traded from the SADC region as live pets.

- Caracal are traded legally as trophies and as live animals – regulated through CITES. Between 2004 – 2015, Caracal were considered one of the top five highest value felid species exported as live and captive-bred individuals (estimated total value of Caracal exports excluding trophies was USD 0.5 million; Sinovas et al. 2016). South Africa is the main legal exporter of felid products (live, bones, skeletons) (CITES Trade Database, UNEP-WCMS). Evidence of exports of live felids being mismanaged (lack of traceability and poor reporting to CITES) have been raised (EMS, 2020) and it is worth highlighting as a potential emerging issue as the amended captive lion regulations are implemented in the near future and markets may be displaced (see section 4.1.3 above).
- An examination of current species under pressure, and their history of sourcing and markets can also provide insights into potential new species that may become more prevalent in the illegal pet trade. The trade in Asian otter species for example: currently the otter trade in Southeast Asia is placing pressure on wild Asian otter species as there is a market for them as pets and as petting animals in numerous ‘wildlife cafes’ in Japan (Kitade and Naruse, 2018). Previous trends have shown a shift in demand from an Asian species to an African species (e.g., pangolin, rhino, tortoises), and thus such patterns should be used proactively to consider potential ‘new’ species in the illegal pet trade.
- The confiscation of live animals from such illegal trade is also an important consideration. Currently, policies regarding the fate of confiscated animals are recommended by CITES and animals are either euthanised, repatriated to their native country and released, or kept in captivity (Rivera et al. 2021). Further development of policies regarding this must consider the impacts of these animals re-entering legal trade and the impacts that have on demand, as well as animal welfare and ethical responsibilities.

#### 4.2.7 Bushmeat

The growing challenge that the bushmeat trade places on wildlife populations in PAs in Southern Africa was highlighted in the previous SADC LEAP. Research shows that the hunting and consumption of wild meat from protected areas in Malawi, for instance, is pervasive despite considerable investment into community projects and enforcement (van Velden et al. 2020). In Tanzania, despite bushmeat trade being illegal, poachers trade in urban centres domestically as well as across the border to Kenya suggesting a lack of effective enforcement (Andimile and Floros, 2021). A wide variety of species are targeted for this trade, including giraffes (specifically including cross-border trade with Kenya), numerous antelope species, porcupine, snakes, and land snails in addition to the more high-profile species such as pangolin, lion, and elephant. The diversity of wildlife products in the bushmeat trade highlights that this major threat to many ‘lower profile’ species is still a significant conservation challenges, and one that is reported to have increased significantly across the region since the onset of the COVID-19 lockdowns.

---

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/to-prevent-next-pandemic-focus-on-legal-wildlife-trade>

#### 4.2.8 Corruption as a facilitator for wildlife crime

Corruption is a key enabler of wildlife trafficking globally. For an illegal wildlife product to be sourced, transported, exported, marketed and sold, it moves through a system that requires corruption to function. At the level of sourcing wildlife products, corruption initially manifests amongst individuals tasked with 'responsible gatekeeping' (e.g., PA management staff, field rangers or gate staff) – those who are in a position to permit/enable access, pass on information or turn a blind eye. At the next level of initial transport and sometimes processing of the illegally obtained wildlife products, corruption may occur at checkpoints and involve authorities like police officers and customs officials. Further along the value-chain the transportation of the illegal products to their end-market is characterised by more organised and pre-emptive corruption. This typically involves both the private sector (e.g., logistics and transport companies) and the public sector (e.g., customs and/or permitting management authorities). At another level, if illegal consignments are intercepted and criminals apprehended, corruption may occur during the investigation, prosecution and sometimes judicial processes of the criminal cases against members of organised wildlife crime networks.

Tackling corruption is typically seen only through the lens of investigations and prosecutions, but this approach alone is unlikely to succeed as corruption has diverse drivers that depend on the local context and the relevant political, economic and social or organisational cultures. Rather a combination of approaches to tackle these drivers is needed to reduce corruption and build resilience to it. The types of approaches needed include, i) investigations and prosecutions, ii) increasing transparency to expose corruption, iii) organisational development or strengthening, iv) strengthening organisational culture and building integrity, and v) using behavioural science approaches to change individual perceptions and behaviours.

#### 4.2.9 Convergence IWT and other illicit flows

Typically, convergence of the flows of illicit products comes in two forms:

1. Network convergence – where the same organised crime networks are trading in multiple commodities, and
2. Facilitator or broker convergence – where the commodities (being trafficked by different networks) are handled or processed by the same facilitator or broker as they pass through a critical transport hub or some other bottleneck.

There are multiple examples of both types of convergence with wildlife products, showing how central IWT has become to organised criminal networks and global illicit flows. Some examples include:

- In Madagascar, cannabis and radiated tortoises travel by the same roads and through the same police checkpoints from the south-west to Antananarivo. At IVATO airport in Antananarivo, tortoises and heroin are both trafficked by mules in-person or in checked baggage, using the same facilitators. From Mahajanga port in the north-west, tortoises, cannabis and migrants are smuggled by boat to Comoros - generally, this is not the same networks trading in multiple products, but rather different networks that make use of the same trafficking routes and facilitators in key vulnerable sites - where corruption has weakened rule of law and overall governance (Nelson and Cochrane, 2020).
- The Kromah network that was indicted by the Southern District of New York in 2019 has been charged with ivory, rhino horn and heroin trafficking (Dept Justice, 2019; Morris, 2019).

- When Pemba in northern Mozambique was a major exit point for ivory shipments to Asia (~2015-17), it was known that ivory was being trafficked into northern Mozambique down the coast of Tanzania on the same dhows that brought migrants and Islamic extremists.
- Abalone poaching and trafficking in South Africa has a long history of convergence with the local drugs trade, especially synthetic drugs. In the late 1990's Chinese traffickers were known to exchange drug precursors for dried abalone. Currently, the same gangs that distribute drugs and control extortion markets parts of the Western Cape of South Africa also control abalone poaching.

#### 4.2.10 Other issues of concern.

There are other key issues of concern that are constantly evolving. Some current issues include:

- Evolving methods of concealment (e.g., the local processing of rhino horn into jewellery to be easily transported out of the region, Moneron et al. 2017).
- The shift to online markets presents both threats and opportunities, but as they are dynamic and flexible, shifts in online trends require quick and collaborative monitoring and action between both source and market countries.
- Post COVID-19, concerns regarding the IWT are uncertain and varied. On the one hand, hesitancy regarding trade in wild animals due to the pandemic could have a positive impact. On the other, economic hardships and a lack of other economic opportunities could result in an increase in domestic use of bushmeat as well as wildlife for traditional medicine.
- The role and influence of expat communities, particularly Chinese communities living within African countries, is also bringing a change to local wildlife markets, and there are concerns that this is resulting in domestic production of TCM treatments – thus creating new markets for some of these treatments.

## 5 KEY LESSONS FROM THIS SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The following are a list of key lessons and thoughts from this situational analysis:

### Conceptual considerations – drawn from the overall review:

- Corruption plays a central role in wildlife crime – particularly wildlife trafficking. In general, corruption supports the existence of organized crime, because corrupt public officials protect organized criminal groups from law enforcement and disruption, and also facilitate the movement of illicit goods across borders.
- Wildlife crime should be addressed strategically in its key component parts – poaching versus trafficking. Typically, the criminals involved in these two different aspects of wildlife crime are quite different, and similarly the strategies, actions and the key players required to tackle them are different.
- Tackling wildlife poaching is typically done at the level of PA or area immediately surrounding a PA and involves the PA management authority and key partners involved in the governance and management of that area, including local communities.
- Tackling wildlife trafficking typically involves taking an organised crime investigations approach and focuses on the criminal networks that are storing or moving the products, and the hubs or bottlenecks through which they are moving the products. This work overlaps with other illicit flows and organised crime type activity and there is often convergence. The wildlife management

authority can play a role in this type of work, but typically this is a support or facilitation role to national agencies with the mandate and capacity to investigate organised criminal networks.

- Partnerships have proven to be critically important in tackling wildlife crime – both at a PA level through collaborative management partnerships, and at a national level in support of WCUs. Almost exclusively, where there is success in tackling wildlife crime there are trusted and working partnerships.

Member state inputs – drawn from interviews with the Member States:

- Overall Member States were fairly neutral regarding the positive benefits gained from the current SADC LEAP strategy. However, all Member States referred to it in some way or another during their CWC strategy development or in planning their CWC work. Most Member States reported that they assessed the context for their CWC work and then drew what was relevant from the LEAP strategy – using it as a guide to think about what they needed. In some instances, Member States specifically spoke about wanting the SADC LEAP strategy to be more of a strategic framework that provided an overview and guidance, and acted as a mechanism for coordination, and then each Member State could draw from it to develop their own CWC strategies. Under an approach like this the SADC secretariat would play an active role in ensuring alignment and regular coordination between Member States, as well as providing regular central feedback on what each country is achieving, or struggling with, through consolidated reports from the M&E framework.
- All Member States interviewed and engaged with reported positive outcomes in terms of improved legislation that criminalised wildlife crime, drew a distinction between poaching and trafficking (i.e., killing the animal vs possessing or trading in the wildlife product), and having mandatory minimum sentences. Further, most Member States reported positive engagement processes with both Prosecutors and the Judiciary. In all cases this had been done with outside support from partners, typically through engagement and training exercises. This engagement led to improved outcomes in cases, or it helped to identify where problems remained – either because of a lack of capacity or sometimes as a result of corruption.
- Rapid reference guides for investigators and prosecutors have been developed in some Member States and received very positive reviews as they help to build appropriate and stronger cases from the beginning and should help to build case that are less likely to be overturned on appeal.
- Court monitoring has been shown to be effective in improving outcomes in court cases. It helps in multiple ways, i) by being able to track update on changes to legislation, ii) being able to get feedback on the uptake of training programs, iii) identifying capacity gaps in courts, and iv) helping to proactively address possible corruption in major courts cases.
- Trusted WCUs have become a proven strategy in the Member States that have had success at dismantling and successfully prosecuting organised wildlife traffickers. The common factors for successful WCUs seem to be: i) that it is a small and trusted unit, and is thus resilient to corruption, ii) that it is mandated for the law enforcement capacities required to investigate and arrest organised criminals, or it includes or works closely with the agency that has those capacities, iii) that it has good leadership, iv) that it undertakes standard criminal investigations techniques to tackle organised crime (e.g., surveillance, using undercover sources to penetrate networks, intercepting communications, etc.), and iv) that it is fairly well resourced with adequate operational funds – typically this means that it has a close working relationship with a trusted local partner that is able to access and make available appropriate donor funds.

- Once WCUs are functional they appear to build trusted working relationships with other key national law enforcement agencies, and sometimes with similar units in neighbouring countries.
- A number of Member States reported positive working relationships with neighbouring states working on specific cases – in most instances these appeared to be built on trusted relationships between people who know each other or were introduced by a trusted third party.
- Only a few Member States reported using intelligence collection and analysis proactively to profile priority organised crime groups, or corrupt facilitators, to target and then to proactively build cases against them. One Member State in particular reported significant success in identifying and building cases against corrupt officials using this approach.
- More needs to be done to better understand and tease out the linkages between CBNRM and reduced wildlife crime, and the conditions that this occurs under. There are also many conditions under which CBNRM is not tenable and other strategies are needed to engage local communities in reducing wildlife crime (e.g. FLoD). It is worth considering whether the objective for a wildlife crime prevention strategy is actually the integration of people and nature, or whether it should be community crime prevention.
- It may be worth broadening the objective on sustainable trade and use of natural resources to make it about sustainable financing for CWC activities. Current international conditions make sustainable trade in high value wildlife products unlikely, so broadening the focus to be more about financing options rather than one type of financing may make more sense.
- Member States reported significant improvements in field operations to combat wildlife poaching. Member States reported the following as contributing to these advances:
  - o Collaborative management partnerships - almost all PAs where there have been significant improvements in anti-poaching operations and PA law enforcement, are being managed under some form of partnership agreement.
  - o Field leadership - successful PA law enforcement operations almost all follow investment in field team leadership.
  - o Selection, basic training and in-service training - when applied well these have shown to be key factors.
  - o K9 units - a number of PAs with successful operations have K9 units.
  - o Law enforcement monitoring (LEM) – is improving deployments to priority sites and allows adaptive patrol management if needed. Joint planning also helps motivation.
  - o Field intelligence collection, analysis and feedback – these systems are being used to better target PA law enforcement operations.
- Corruption was raised as a key driver of wildlife crime by four Member States, meanwhile nine of the other Member States consulted agreed that corruption needed to be addressed as a key issue underpinning wildlife crime.

Consultant thoughts:

- Addressing corruption needs to be central to the new strategy – this is possibly the most important facilitator of wildlife crime in the region.
- We should consider a framework approach that allows Member States to draw principles and best practise that are applicable to their local context and challenges.
- We need to define the SADC secretariat’s capacity clearly and realistically and not over-promise. There is a key role for central coordination and liaison, but this does not require actively

coordinating cases. There is also a need for lessons learned (which could be drawn from annual M&E returns) to be shared.

- There are certain key actions which clearly make a positive difference to reducing wildlife crime in nearly all cases where they have been applied. These include establishing Wildlife Crime Units and entering into well-structured supportive agreements with trusted partners.
- Another key consideration that needs to be thought through is how to strengthen governance and management of key institutions so that they are more resilient to corruption and so that they can effectively fulfil their mandate to combat wildlife crime.
- The role of community engagement to reduce wildlife crime needs more thought to be sure that our assumptions are correct and that we are targeting the correct actions to reduce crime, not just to succeed in engaging with local communities for engagement's sake.
- Lessons learned from successful PA management and anti-poaching operations need to be mainstreamed into national PA management authorities. A lot of these are already included in the IUCN Review of Best Practises for Wildlife Law Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>29</sup>.

---

<sup>29</sup> <https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/46088>



## Appendix 1: Documents consulted

AEF. 2019. African Elephant Fund. <https://www.africanelephantfund.org/success-stories>

African Elephant Management Plan. 2010. CoP15 Inf. 68. CITES.

Andimile, M., Floros, C. 2021. Rapid assessment of the bushmeat trade in urban centres in Tanzania: an analysis from Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Mbeya, Arusha, and Manyara. TRAFFIC.

Aucoin, C. and Z. Donnenfeld. 2017. Guns, poison and horns Organised wildlife crime in Southern Africa. ENACT Research Paper. Issue 1.

Bauer, H., Packer, C., Funston, P., Henschel, P. and Nowell, K. 2016. *Panthera leo* (errata version published in 2017). The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species.

Challender, D.W.S., et al. 2019. Evaluating the feasibility of pangolin farming and its potential conservation impact. Global Ecology and Conservation, Volume 20, October 2019, e00714.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2019.e00714>

Chelin, R. 2019. A question of scales: Assessing strategies for countering illegal trafficking of pangolins in Africa. ENACT Policy Brief 12.

CITES. 2016. Report on the Elephant Trade Information System. CITES CoP17, 24 September – 5 October 2016. Johannesburg.

<https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E-CoP17-57-06-R1.pdf>

Constant, R., Okes, N., Bürgener, M., Louw, S., Frank, M. 2020. Maw Trade: A rapid assessment of the trade in fish swim bladders from Africa to Hong Kong SAR.

Dept of Justice. 2019. Members Of African Criminal Enterprise Charged With Large-Scale Trafficking Of Rhinoceros Horns And Elephant Ivory And Heroin Distribution. The United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. Press Release. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/members-african-criminal-enterprise-charged-large-scale-trafficking-rhinoceros-horns>

DNPW. 2015. Illegal Wildlife Trade Review Malawi. May 2015. <https://www.lilongwewildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/IWT-Review-Malawi.pdf>

EC. 2021. Commission proposes new measures to ban trade in ivory.

[https://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/commission-proposes-new-measures-ban-trade-ivory-2021-01-28\\_enm](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/commission-proposes-new-measures-ban-trade-ivory-2021-01-28_enm)

EIA. 2013. First Class Connections. Log smuggling, illegal logging and corruption in Mozambique. Environmental Investigation Agency. London

EIA. 2017. The Shuidong Connection: Exposing the global hub of the illegal ivory trade. Environmental Investigation Agency. <https://eia-international.org/report/shuidong-connection-exposing-global-hub-illegal-ivory-trade/>

EIA. 2019. Busted: China Customs dismantles major ivory trafficking syndicate. Environmental Investigation Agency press release. <https://eia-international.org/press-releases/busted-china-customs-dismantles-major-ivory-trafficking-syndicate-2/>

EIA. 2020. Out of Africa How West and Central Africa have become the epicentre of ivory and pangolin scale trafficking to Asia. Wildlife. Environmental Investigation Agency. <https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/Out-of-Africa-SINGLE-PAGES.pdf>

EIA. 2021. Huge ivory and pangolin scale bust in Nigeria is a chance to disrupt wildlife crime networks. Environmental Investigation Agency. <https://eia-international.org/news/huge-ivory-and-pangolin-scale-bust-in-nigeria-is-a-chance-to-disrupt-wildlife-crime-networks/>

Eligh, 2021. A Synthetic Age: The Evolution of Methamphetamine Markets in Eastern and Southern Africa. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/meth-africa/>

EMS. 2020. Breaking point: Uncovering South Africa's shameful live wildlife trade with China. The Extinction Business Investigative Report Series. Part Two. EMS Foundation and Ban Animal Trading. [https://emsfoundation.org.za/wp-content/uploads/BreakingPoint\\_FINAL\\_15052020\\_web.pdf](https://emsfoundation.org.za/wp-content/uploads/BreakingPoint_FINAL_15052020_web.pdf)

Emslie, R.H., Milliken, T., Talukdar, B., Ellis, S., Adcock, K., and M. Knight. 2016. A report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN SSC) African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15).

ETIS. 2020. Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) Report: Overview of seizure data and progress on requests from the 69th and 70th meetings of the Standing Committee (SC69 and SC70) September 2020. CITES.

Everatt, K.T., Kokes, R. and Lopez Pereira, C. 2019. Evidence of a further emerging threat to lion conservation; targeted poaching for body parts. *Biodivers Conserv* 28, 4099–4114. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-019-01866-w>

Funston, P., Henschel, P., Hunter, L., Lindsey, P., Nowak, K., Vallianos, C. and Wood, K. 2016. Beyond Cecil: Africa's lions in crisis. Panthera, WildAid & WildCRU. 25pp

Heinrich, S., Wittman, T.A., Ross, J.V., Shepherd, C.R., Challender, D.W.S., and Cassey, P. 2017. The Global Trafficking of Pangolins: A comprehensive summary of seizures and trafficking routes from 2010–2015. TRAFFIC, Southeast Asia Regional Office, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia.

Hong Kong. 2018. Protection of Endangered Species of Animals and Plants (Amendment) Ordinance 2018, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, <https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20182206/es1201822067.pdf>

IUCN. 2016. African elephant status report 2016: an update from the African Elephant Database. IUCN SSC, AfESG. <https://www.iucn.org/content/african-elephant-status-report-2016-update-african-elephant-database>

IUCN. 2021. Local Communities - First Line of Defence against Illegal Wildlife Trade (FLoD). <https://www.iucn.org/regions/eastern-and-southern-africa/our-work/conservation-areas-and-species/local-communities-first-line-defence-against-illegal-wildlife-trade-flod>

Janssen, J. 2021. A Primer to the Global Trade of Reptiles: Magnitude, Key Challenges, and Implications for Conservation. In: Underkoffler S.C., Adams H.R. (eds) Wildlife Biodiversity Conservation. Springer, Cham. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64682-0\\_17](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64682-0_17)

KAZA. 2019. Strategic planning framework for the conservation and management of elephants in the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area.

Keir, T. 2021. How rhino protectors in South Africa have become a major threat to the species. National Geographic. Published 6 July 2021. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/how-rhino-protectors-in-south-africa-became-threat-to-species>

Kitade T. and Naruse Y. 2018. Otter Alert: A rapid assessment of illegal trade and booming demand in Japan

Knight, M. 2019. African Rhino Specialist Group Chair report. Pachyderm No. 60.

Knight, M. 2020. African Rhino Specialist Group Chair report. Pachyderm No. 61.

Louw, S., 2020. Trade in High Value Marine Products from Africa to Asia. TRAFFIC.

Louw, S., and Bürgener, M. 2020. Seahorse trade dynamics from Africa to Asia. TRAFFIC Bulletin Vol. 32 No. 1. 37–44.

Louw, S., Bürgener, M., 2020. A Rapid Assessment of the Sea Cucumber trade from Africa to Asia.

Maisels F, Strindberg S, Blake S, Wittemyer G, Hart J, Williamson EA, et al. 2013. Devastating Decline of Forest Elephants in Central Africa. PLoS ONE 8(3). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0059469>

Martin, A., Floros, C. 2020. A rapid assessment of the trade threats of nearshore fisheries along the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania. TRAFFIC, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

McLellan et al. 2014. Illicit wildlife trafficking: an environmental, economic and social issue. UNEP Perspectives (14).

MEFT-NAMPOL. 2020. Combating Wildlife Crime in Namibia: Annual Report 2020.

[https://www.met.gov.na/files/downloads/bb9\\_MEFT-NAMPOL\\_Annual-Report\\_Wildlife-Crime\\_2020\\_F-R1\\_210226\\_s.pdf](https://www.met.gov.na/files/downloads/bb9_MEFT-NAMPOL_Annual-Report_Wildlife-Crime_2020_F-R1_210226_s.pdf)

MIKE. 2014. Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) Report: PIKE trend analysis – Methodology and Results September 2020. CITES.

MIKE. 2020. Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) Report: PIKE trend analysis – Methodology and Results September 2020. CITES.

Milledge, S.A.H., Gelas, I. K. and Ahrends, A. 2007. Forestry, Governance and National Development: Lessons Learned from a Logging Boom in Southern Tanzania. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa/Tanzania Development Partners Group/Ministry of Natural Resources of Tourism, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 252pp.

Mole, K. H., Newton, D. 2020. An assessment of trade, mortalities and anthropogenic threats facing lions in Tanzania and Mozambique. TRAFFIC.

Moneron, S. and Drinkwater, E. 2021. The Often-Overlooked Ivory Trade - A rapid assessment of the international trade in hippo ivory between 2009 and 2018. TRAFFIC, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Moneron, S., Okes, N. and Rademeyer, J. 2017. Pendants, Powder and Pathways. TRAFFIC, East/Southern Africa Regional Office, Hatfield, Pretoria, South Africa

Morris, C. 2019. Moazu Kromah and the Case of the West African Ivory Cartel. International Policy Digest. <https://intpolicydigest.org/moazu-kromah-and-the-case-of-the-west-african-ivory-cartel/>

Nellemann, C., Henriksen, R., Kreilhuber, A., Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Raxter, P., Mrema, E., and Barrat, S. (Eds). 2016. The Rise of Environmental Crime – A Growing Threat To Natural Resources Peace, Development And Security. A UNEPINTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme and RHIPTO Rapid Response–Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, [www.rhipto.org](http://www.rhipto.org)

Nelson, A. 2020. A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/triangle-vulnerability-swahili-coast/>

Nelson, A., and Cochrane, J. 2020. Trafficking Malagasy Tortoises: Vulnerabilities and illicit markets in the western Indian Ocean. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/trafficking-malagasy-tortoises/>

Niskanen, L., Roe, D., Rowe, W., Dublin, H. and Skinner D. (2018) Strengthening local community engagement in combating illegal wildlife trade - Case studies from Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: IUCN. iii + 36p

Nkoke, S.C. Lagrot J.F. Ringuet, S. and Milliken, T. 2017. [Ivory Markets in Central Africa – Market Surveys in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon: 2007, 2009, 2014/2015](#). TRAFFIC. Yaoundé, Cameroon and Cambridge, UK.

Nott, K., Nott, A. and Newton, D. 2020. A Critical Assessment of the Economic and Environmental Sustainability of the Namibian Indigenous Forest/ Timber Industry with Reference to Zambia and Angola. TRAFFIC, Southern Africa Programme Office, Pretoria.

Okes N., Bürgener M., Moneron S., Rademeyer J. 2018. Empty Shells: An assessment of abalone poaching and trade from southern Africa. TRAFFIC, Southern Africa Programme Office, Pretoria.

Rahman, M. A., & Yusoff, F. 2017. Sea Cucumber Fisheries: Market Potential, Trade, Utilization and Challenges for Expanding the Production in the South-East Asia. International Journal of Advances in Chemical Engineering and Biological Sciences, 4(1): 26–30.  
<https://doi.org/10.15242/ijacebs.er0117033>

Rivera, S., Knight, A. and S.P. McCulloch. 2021. Surviving the Wildlife Trade in Southeast Asia: Reforming the ‘Disposal’ of Confiscated Live Animals under CITES. Animals 11, no. 2: 439.  
<https://doi.org/10.3390/ani11020439>

Roe, D., Biggs, D., Dublin, H., and Cooney, R. 2016. [Engaging communities to combat illegal wildlife trade: a theory of change](#). IIED Briefing Paper.

Roe D., Dublin. H., Niskanen L., Skinner, D., and Vishwanath, A. 2018. [Local communities: the overlooked first line of defence for wildlife](#). IIED Briefing Paper.

Save the Rhino. 2020. Poaching statistics. <https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino-info/poaching-stats/>

Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales. Wildlife Justice Commission’s Intelligence Development Unit.

SARS. 2021. Media Release: Customs officers make massive bust of rhino horn weighing 160kg.  
<https://www.sars.gov.za/media-release/media-release-customs-officers-make-massive-bust-of-rhino-horn-weighing-160kg/>

Sinovas, P., Price, B., King, E., Davis, F., Hinsley, A. and Pavitt, A. 2016. Southern Africa’s wildlife trade: an analysis of CITES trade in SADC countries. Technical report prepared for the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI). UNEP-WCMC, Cambridge, UK.

TRAFFIC. 2019a. Africa’s illegal wildlife trade: bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter.

TRAFFIC. 2019b. Singapore makes record-breaking African ivory and pangolin seizure <https://www.traffic.org/news/singapore-makes-record-breaking-african-ivory-and-pangolin-seizure/>

TRAFFIC. 2020. Africa's illegal wildlife trade: bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter bi-annual wildlife enforcement newsletter.

UNODC. 2020. World Wildlife Crime Report 2020: Trafficking in Protected Species. United Nations.

UNODC. 2021. Combating Maritime Crime in Comoros. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2021/March/combating-maritime-crime-in-comoros.html>

UNODC. 2021. Links between organised crime and corruption. <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-4/key-issues/links-to-corruption.html>

Van Uhm, D.P. 2016. The Illegal Wildlife Trade: Inside the World of Poachers, Smugglers and Traders. Springer International Publishing, Switzerland.

van Velden, J.L., Wilson, K., Lindsey, P.A. et al. 2020. Bushmeat hunting and consumption is a pervasive issue in African savannahs: insights from four protected areas in Malawi. *Biodivers Conserv* 29, 1443–1464. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-020-01944-4>

Wasser, S.K., Brown, L., Mailand, C., Mondol, S., Clark, W., Laurie, C., and Weir, B.S. 2015. Genetic assignment of large seizures of elephant ivory reveals Africa's major poaching hotspots. *Science*. 2015 Jul 3. 349(6243): 84–87. [10.1126/science.aaa2457](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa2457)

Wildlife Justice Commission. 2019. A Preliminary Analysis of Raw Rhino Horn Prices in Africa and Asia. <https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FINAL-raw-rhino-horn-digital-1.pdf>

Wildlife Justice Commission. 2020a. Rapid assessment of the illegal ivory trade in 2020. Wildlife Justice Commission's Intelligence Development Unit. [https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/WildlifeJusticeCommission\\_Rapid-Assessment-Of-The-Illegal-Ivory-Trade-in-2020\\_August2020\\_Spreads.pdf](https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/WildlifeJusticeCommission_Rapid-Assessment-Of-The-Illegal-Ivory-Trade-in-2020_August2020_Spreads.pdf)

Wildlife Justice Commission. 2020b. Scaling up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales, 2016-2019. Wildlife Justice Commission's Intelligence Development Unit. [https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/The\\_Rapid\\_Growth\\_in\\_the\\_Trafficking\\_of\\_Pangolin\\_Scales\\_2015-2019-Update1.pdf](https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/The_Rapid_Growth_in_the_Trafficking_of_Pangolin_Scales_2015-2019-Update1.pdf)

Wildlife Trade Portal. <https://www.wildlifetradeportal.org/#/dashboard>

Williams V.L., Coals P.G., de Bruyn M., Naude V.N., Dalton D.L., Kotze A. 2021. Monitoring compliance of CITES lion bone exports from South Africa. *PLoS ONE* 16(4): e0249306. <https://doi.org/>

Williams V.L., Newton D., Loveridge A.J., Macdonald D.W. 2015. Bones of Contention: an Assessment of the South African Trade in African Lion *Panthera leo* Bones and other Body Parts. Cambridge: TRAFFIC and Oxford: WildCRU; 2015. [http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic\\_species\\_mammals83.pdf](http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_mammals83.pdf).

World Bank. 2019. Illegal logging, fishing, and wildlife trade: the costs and how to combat it. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/482771571323560234-0120022019/original/WBGReport1017Digital.pdf>

WWF. 2021a. Fewer Rhinos Poached in South Africa in 2020 Aligns With Worrying Population Decline in Kruger National Park. <https://www.worldwildlife.org/press-releases/fewer-rhinos-poached-in-south-africa-in-2020-aligns-with-worrying-population-decline-in-kruger-national-park>

WWF. 2021b. WWF reacts to 2020 rhino poaching figures in South Africa. [https://www.wwf.org.za/our\\_news/news/?33383/WWF-reacts-to-2020-rhino-poaching-figures-in-South-Africa](https://www.wwf.org.za/our_news/news/?33383/WWF-reacts-to-2020-rhino-poaching-figures-in-South-Africa)

## Appendix 2: People consulted

### A2.1 Member State workshop attendees (2-3 June 2021)

Two half-day workshops on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2021 were convened under this contract with the purpose of gathering inputs from SADC Member States for the revision of SADC-LEAP strategic framework. Member States were invited to attend either day (these were repeat workshops) and French and Portuguese simultaneous translation was made available on the second day.

	Name	Organisation	Type of organisation <sup>30</sup>	Country
1	Adrian Kholi	DWNP	G	Botswana
2	Thulani Methula	NTC	G	Eswatini
3	Mick Reilly	BGP	C/G	Eswatini
4	Bataung Mokhele	MTEC	G	Lesotho
5	Sub Insp Mosaase	MTEC	G	Lesotho
6	Narivo Razakamanarivo	MEDD	G	Madagascar
7	Alex Chunga	DNPW	G	Malawi
8	Carlos Lopes Pereira	ANAC	G	Mozambique
9	Sonja Meintjes	DEFF	G	South Africa
10	Rudzani Mudau	DEFF	G	South Africa
11	Andrew Chomba	DNPW	G	Zambia
12	Lusizi Mwale	DNPW	G	Zambia
13	Jones Masonde	DNPW	G	Zambia
14	Patience Gandiwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
15	Arthur Musakwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
16	Godfrey Mtare	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
17	Fainos Chuma	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
18	Phillimon November	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
19	Chizamsoka Manda	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
20	Dieter Nill	GIZ	D/P	Regional
21	Alastair Nelson	Conservation Synergies	Facilitator	Regional

<sup>30</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector



22	Beth Skorochod	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional
23	Nicola Okes	Conservation Synergies	Support	Regional

### **A2.2 Individual interviews conducted (January – November 2021)**

Numerous individual interviews were conducted by the consultant for this work (Alastair Nelson) in the first half of 2021. Some of these were conducted specifically for this contract. Some were conducted for the USAID VukaNow project to provide input into their SPARCC-7 workshop (see section A2.3.1 below), and some were conducted for other work being done on emerging wildlife crime threats and convergence with other types of organised crime activities in the region. Interviews that were used to inform this situational analysis are listed below:

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Type of organisation<sup>31</sup></b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Date interviewed</b>
1	Ryan Olson	US-DEA	G	Mozambique	12/01/2021
2	Carlos Lopes Pereira	ANAC	G	Mozambique	13/01/2021
3	David Chambal	WCS	C	Mozambique	14/01/2021
4	Agostinho Jorge	NCP/Mariri	C	Mozambique	25/01/2021
5	Tamrini Said	DoF	G	Zanzibar	27/01/2021
6	Pat McDarby	US-DEA	G	Tanzania	28/01/2021
7	Phil Alegranti	USFWS	G	Tanzania	01/02/2021
8	Tim Davenport	WCS	C	Regional	01/02/2021
9	Robert Mande	MNRT (WD)	G	Tanzania	02/02/2021
10	Krissie Clark	PAMS	C	Tanzania	09/02/2021
11	Brighton Kumchedwa	DNPW	G	Malawi	26/02/2021
12	Alex Chunga	DNPW	G	Malawi	26/02/2021
13	Antony Alexander	PPF	C	Mozambique	26/02/2021
14	Patience Gandiwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe	26/02/2021
15	Ed Sayer	FZS	C	Zambia	26/02/2021
16	Hugo van der Westhuizen	FZS	C	Zimbabwe	28/02/2021
17	Craig Hay	WWF-SA	C	Regional	02/02/2021
18	Andrew Chomba	DNPW	G	Zambia	03/03/2021

<sup>31</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector

19	Frances Craigie	DEFF	G	South Africa	05/03/2021
20	Barri de Klerk	NamPol	G	Namibia	05/03/2021
21	Vincent Guillemin	BRTF	G	Namibia	05/03/2021
22	Jo Tagg	Rooikat	C	Namibia	08/03/2021
23	Afonso Madope	WCS	C	Mozambique	06/04/2021
24	Max Baloyi	DEFF	G	South Africa	08/04/2021
25	Gen (ret) Johan Jooste	DEFF	G	South Africa	08/04/2021
26	Russ Stanford	USFWS	G	Regional	09/04/2021
27	Jason Eligh	GI-TOC	C	Regional	14/06/2021
28	Mary Rice	EIA	C	Regional	08/07/2021
29	Adrian Kholi	DWNP	G	Botswana	09/07/2021
30	Albertina Nzuzi	INBAC	G	Angola	09/07/2021
31	Steve Carmody	WJC	C	Regional	12/07/2021
32	Tim Wittig	UfW/FCS	C	Regional	12/07/2021
33	Jonny Vaughan	LWT	C	Malawi	13/07/2021
34	Julian Rademeyer	GI-TOC	C	Regional	15/07/2021
35	Robert Muir	ICCN	G	DRC	01/11/2021
36	Vinesh Gopal	NPCS	G	Mauritius	03/11/2021
37	Jasbeen Mooradkhan	NPCS	G	Mauritius	03/11/2021
38	Shoma Sauba	NPCS	G	Mauritius	03/11/2021
39	Aradhna Goory	NPCS	G	Mauritius	03/11/2021
40	Sewajee Pandoo	NPCS	G	Mauritius	03/11/2021
41	Sameer Kaudeer	UNDP	I	Mauritius	03/11/2021
42	Marie-May Muzungaile	MoACCE	G	Seychelles	04/11/2021
43	Kevin Moumou	MoACCE	G	Seychelles	04/11/2021
44	Ashley Pothin	MoACCE	G	Seychelles	04/11/2021

### A2.3 SADC Regional Technical Validation Meeting (25-26 October 2021)

	Name	Organisation	Type of organisation <sup>32</sup>	Country
1	Antônio Nascimento	INBAC	G	Angola
2	Adrian Kholi	DWNP	G	Botswana
3	Thulani Methula	NTC	G	eSwatini
4	Bataung Mokhele	MTEC	G	Lesotho
5	Sub Insp Mosaase	MTEC	G	Lesotho
6	Alex Chunga	DNPW	G	Malawi
7	Vinesh Gopal	NPCS	G	Mauritius
8	Carlos Lopes Pereira	ANAC	G	Mozambique
9	Theunis Petersen	MET	G	Namibia
10	Marie-May Muzungaile	MoACCE	G	Seychelles
11	Ashley Pothin	MoACCE	G	Seychelles
12	Sonja Meintjes	DEFF	G	South Africa
13	Eligi Paul Kimario	WD	G	Tanzania
14	Kay Kagaruki	WD	G	Tanzania
15	Matthews Mushimbalume	DNPW	G	Zambia
16	Fulton Mangwanya	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
17	Patience Gandiwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
18	Edson Gandiwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
19	Arthur Musakwa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
20	Godfrey Mtare	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
21	Fainos Chuma	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
22	Kwanele Manungo	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
23	Midwell Kapesa	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
24	Nothando Moyo	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe
25	Sekayi Matanga	ZPWMA	G	Zimbabwe

<sup>32</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector

26	Domingos Gove	SADC	I	Regional
27	George Wambura	SADC	I	Regional
28	Nunes Mazivila	SADC	I	Regional
29	Chizamsoka Manda	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
30	Dieter Nill	GIZ	D/P	Regional
31	Alastair Nelson	Conservation Synergies	Consultant	Regional

## **A2.4 Other relevant meetings / workshops attended**

### **A2.4.1 USAID VukaNow SPARCC-7: Implementation of SADC LEAP Strategy: Lessons, Models and the Way Forward (March 2021)**

USAID VukaNow is a regional project implemented by Chemonics that works to coordinate learning across six USAID funded transboundary CWC projects in the region and their government partners. One mechanism that it uses to achieve this is to hold quarterly learning workshops on specific topics that are brought forward by the landscape leads and their government partners. This was a two-day virtual workshop held on the 9th and 10th of March 2021 to share models, lessons and experiences on how the SADC-LEAP strategy was implemented across the region and make recommendations for how each organisation could engage with the SADC-LEAP strategy going forward. Attendees were:

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Type of organisation<sup>33</sup></b>	<b>Country</b>
1	Brighton Kumchedwa	DNPW	G	Malawi
2	Carlos Lopes Pereira	ANAC	G	Mozambique
3	Frances Craigie	DEFF	G	South Africa
4	Sonja Meintjes	DEFF	G	South Africa
5	Max Baloyi	DEFF	G	South Africa
6	Lusizi Mwale	DNPW	G	Zambia
7	Edward Chilufya	DNPW	G	Zambia
8	Mathews Mushimbalume	DNPW	G	Zambia
9	George Wambura	SADC	I	Regional
10	Tawanda Noel Gotosa	SADC	I	Regional
11	Ashley Netherton	USAID	D/P	Regional
12	Thapelo Motebo	USAID	D/P	Regional

<sup>33</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector

13	Sam Novick	INL	D/P	Regional
14	Nyambe Nyambe	KAZA	I	KAZA
15	Colum Zhuwau	KAZA	I	KAZA
16	Piet Theron	GLTFCA	I	GLTFCA
17	Lola Lopez	GLTFCA	I	GLTFCA
18	Gillian Rhodes	PPF	C	Regional
19	Craig Hay	WWF-SA	C	Regional
20	Jo Shaw	WWF-SA	C	Regional
21	Mike Murphree	WWF-SA	C	GLTFCA
22	Mike Strang	WWF-NA	C	KAZA
23	Russell Taylor	WWF-NA	C	KAZA
24	Melvin Lisao	WWF-NA	C	KAZA
25	Moses Nyirenda	WWF-ZA	C	Zambia
26	Kerri Rademeyer	WCP	C	Zambia
27	Patricio Ndadzela	IFAW	C	MAZALA
28	Paston Simkoko	IFAW	C	MAZALA
29	Mwila Kanonkela Ng'ambi	IFAW	C	MAZALA
30	Theresa Chapulapula	IFAW	C	MAZALA
31	Raoul du Toit	LRT	C	Zimbabwe
32	Chap Masterson	SATWild	C	Zimbabwe
33	Mike Pelham	SATWild	C	Zimbabwe
34	Taku Matezo	THF	C	Zimbabwe
35	Deborah Khatano	VukaNow	C	Regional
36	Simon Munthali	VukaNow	C	Regional
37	Imakando Sinyama	VukaNow	C	Regional
38	Belinda Glenn	VukaNow	C	Regional
39	Chris Gegenheimer	VukaNow	C	Regional
40	Leo Niskanen	IUCN	C	Regional
41	Kudakwashe Chigodo	IUCN	C	Regional

42	Chizamsoka Manda	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
43	Moses Chakanga	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
44	Storme Viljoen	TRAFFIC	C	Regional
45	Rod Potter	Independent	C	Regional
46	Beth Skorochood	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional
47	Richard Crespin	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional
48	Alastair Nelson	Conservation Synergies	TA / Facilitator	Regional

#### A2.4.2 Sub-regional platform for CWC (March 2021)

This sub-regional platform is a four-country group made up of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and the Lusaka Agreement Task Force which meets every 4-6 months to discuss wildlife crime issues. At this meeting on the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2021 a working group was held on 'Lessons learned from this sub-regional group to inform the SADC LEAP framework revision'. Attendees were:

	Name	Organisation	Type of organisation <sup>34</sup>	Country
1	Alex Chunga	DNPW	G	Malawi
2	Miles Zidana	DNPW	G	Malawi
3	Fyson Suwedi	DNPW	C	Malawi
4	Lusizi Mwale	DNPW	G	Zambia
5	Mike Mulena	DNPW	G	Zambia
6	Belinda Haketa	DNPW	G	Zambia
7	Theotimos Rwegasira	MNRT (WD)	C	Tanzania
8	Edward Phiri	LATF	G	Regional
9	Chizamsoka Manda	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
10	Stephanie Lienenlücke	GIZ	D/P	Regional
11	Merle Immig	GIZ	D/P	Regional
12	Alastair Nelson	Conservation Synergies	Facilitator	Regional
13	Beth Skorochood	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional

<sup>34</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector

#### A2.4.3 USAID VukaNow SPARCC-9 & 10: Effective Partnerships and KPI's for CWC impact (June 2021)

See A2.3.1 above for a brief description of the USAID VukaNow regional project. These were two half-day short workshop on specific topics requested by the landscape projects and their government partners. SPARCC-9 on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of June 2021 focused on 'Effective levels of Collaboration and partnership for CWC. SPARCC-10 on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 2021 focused on 'Determining KPIs for measuring the impacts of CWC from protected area to regional level. Both workshops included information and discussions that were of direct relevance to the contents of this document. Attendees were:

	Name	Organisation	Type of organisation <sup>35</sup>	Country
1	Cornelio Miguel	ANAC	G	Mozambique
2	Jorge Fernando	ANAC	G	Mozambique
3	Carmen van Tichelen	DEFF	G	South Africa
4	Barri de Klerk	Nampol	G	Namibia
5	Lusizi Mwale	DNPW	G	Zambia
6	Edward Chilufya	DNPW	G	Zambia
7	Nunes Mazivila	SADC	I	Regional
8	Ashley Netherton	USAID	D/P	Regional
9	Thapelo Motebo	USAID	D/P	Regional
10	Andrew Tobiason	USAID	D/P	Regional
11	Nyambe Nyambe	KAZA	I	KAZA
12	Javier Montano	UNODC	I	Regional
13	Samson Mulonga	WWF-NA	C	KAZA
14	Hertha Itembu	WWF-NA	C	KAZA
15	Patricio Ndadzela	IFAW	C	MAZALA
16	Mwila Kanonkela Ng'ambi	IFAW	C	MAZALA
17	Theresa Chapulapula	IFAW	C	MAZALA
18	Mike Pelham	SATWild	C	Zimbabwe
19	Adam Pires	TRAFFIC	C	Regional
20	Neil Midlane	Wilderness Safaris	P	Regional
21	Wim Brown	Focused Conservation	C	Regional

<sup>35</sup> G = Government, C = Civil Society, D/P = Donor/Technical Partner, I = Inter-governmental, P = Private sector

22	Oscar Mthimkhulu	Sabi Sands	P	South Africa
23	Deborah Khatano	VukaNow	C	Regional
24	Simon Munthali	VukaNow	C	Regional
25	Imakando Sinyama	VukaNow	C	Regional
26	Belinda Glenn	VukaNow	C	Regional
27	Chris Gegenheimer	VukaNow	C	Regional
28	Chizamsoka Manda	GIZ/SADC	D/P	Regional
29	Beth Skorochod	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional
30	Richard Crespin	CollaborateUp	Facilitator	Regional
31	Alastair Nelson	Conservation Synergies	TA / Facilitator	Regional

#### **A2.5 Engagement summary**

In total *141 individuals* were consulted. Of these, *57 individuals work for SADC Member States government agencies, representing 15 SADC Member States*. These are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.